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Justice-as-Fairness as Judicial 
Guiding Principle 
REMEMBERING JOHN RAWLS AND THE 
WARREN COURT 
Michael Anthony Lawrencet 
"I am glad to be going to the Supreme Court because 
now I can help the less fortunate, the people in our society who 
suffer, the disadvantaged."1 
INTRODUCTION 
Seventeen individuals have served as Chief Justice of the 
U.S. Supreme Court since the Constitution's ratification in 1789. 
The decade-and-a-half period when Earl Warren served as the 
fourteenth Chief Justice (1953-1969) was marked by numerous 
landmark rulings in the areas of racial justice, criminal 
procedure, reproductive autonomy, First Amendment freedom of 
speech, association, and religion, voting rights, and more. These 
decisions led to positive, fundamental changes in the lives of 
millions of less advantaged Americans who had been historically 
disfavored because of their race, nationality, gender, 
socioeconomic class, or political views. The legacy of the Warren 
Court is one of an institution committed to "a dedication in the 
law to the timeless ideals of 'human dignity, individual rights, 
and fair play, and [a] recognition that the best of us have no more 
rights or freedoms than the worst of us."'2 For its efforts, the 
t Professor, Michigan State University College of Law; Author, Radicals in 
Their Own Time: Four Hundred Years of Struggle for Liberty and Equal Justice in 
America (2011); Co-Author, Model Problems and Outstanding Answers.- Constitutional 
Law (2013). The author thanks the Michigan State University College of Law Research 
Librarians, especially Jane Meland and Barbara Bean, for their research assistance. 
I ED CRAY, CHIEF JUSTICE: A BIOGRAPHY OF EARL WARREN 255 (1997). 
2 Harry N. Scheiber, The Warren Court, American Law, and Modern Legal 
Cultures, in EARL WARREN AND THE WARREN COURT: THE LEGACY IN AMERICAN AND 
FOREIGN LAW 1, 26 (Harry N. Scheiber ed., 2007) [hereinafter EARL WARREN AND THE 
WARREN COURT). 
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Warren Court is considered by some to be the greatest high court 
in the nation's history. 3 
At the same time, many Warren Court decisions were 
hugely controversial, upsetting the settled expectations of those 
who benefited from long-entrenched governmental biases and 
practices. The ubiquitous "Impeach Earl Warren" billboards seen 
throughout the countryside during the late 1950s and the 1960s 
reflected the underlying efforts of laissez-faire conservatives to 
overturn aspects of the New Deal, which began a quarter century 
earlier.4 The intensity of the political opposition to the Court's 
newfound commitment to fairness and equality was matched only 
by the infamous pre-Civil War Dred Scott case a full century 
earlier.5 To this day and through the decades, conservative jurists, 
academics, and others have bemoaned the Warren Court's 
"lawlessness" and lack of principle.6 
Ultimately, such criticisms proved wanting. By 
demonstrating a consistent concern for the plight of less 
advantaged, less favored members of American society, the 
Warren Court was, to the contrary, highly principled in exercising 
its full powers to achieve fairness and equal protection for all, 
regardless of a person's status in society. We should demand 
nothing less from government, which exists, after all, to serve the 
people-all the people. 
The Warren Court's practice of using its power of equity to 
. achieve fair outcomes closely resembles, at its core, the "justice-
as-fairness" approach promoted in John Rawls's monumental 
1971. work, A Theory of Justice. 7 At its simplest, Rawls suggested 
that in order to achieve a just (or "fair") society, decision-makers 
should operate from the original position of equality behind a so-
called veil of ignorance, where they have no idea of their own 
personal circumstances, in order to promote a just society. If the 
individual decision-maker herself knows she might be among the 
persons most negatively affected by a proposed or possible 
decision, she is much more likely-operating in her own self-
interest-to "hedge her bets" and make a decision that is fair to 
all. By applying this approach, the interests of less advantaged, 
more vulnerable members of society are adequately considered, 
3 See infra Section II.A.2. 
4 Scheiber, supra note 2, at 19. 
I d. 
6 See, e.g., David A. Strauss, The Common Law Genius of the Warren Court, 
49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 845, 847-48 (2007) (citing ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE 
MORALITY OF CONSENT 120 (1975)); Philip B. Kurland, Foreword: "Equal in Origin and 
Equal in Title to the Legislative and Executive Branches of the Government," 78 HARV. 
L. REV. 143, 145 (1964). 
7 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (rev. ed. 1999). 
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promoting the justice-as-fairness principle of equal opportunity 
for all, including the least privileged. 
Of course, Earl Warren and the Warren Court did not 
adopt justice-as-fairness reasoning per se, since Rawls had not 
yet published A Theory of Justice by the time Warren left the 
Court in 1969. Nonetheless, principles of fairness and equal 
opportunity underlie both the Warren Court's jurisprudence 
and Rawls's theory of justice.8 Not incidentally, the same core 
principles guide notions of public virtue, 9 a concept vital to the 
founding generation, and the Golden Rule's ancient mandate, 
long recognized by all of the world's major religious and moral 
authorities as to "do unto others as you would have them do 
unto you." 10 This article proposes that judicial adherence to the 
core principles expressed in these various sources would result 
in a markedly more just society-which should be the ultimate 
goal for any legitimate system of justice. 
This article is divided into three parts. Part I explains 
John Rawls's justice-as-fairness theory and how it has resonated 
in legal and constitutional theory. Part II discusses the Warren 
Court's equity-based jurisprudence and its profound impact on 
creating a more just America. This part also discusses the 
constitutional bases for the Warren Court's decisions, principally 
with respect to the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection 
and Due Process Clauses. Part III then discusses the Warren 
Court's legacy and how its jurisprudence embraced broader 
concepts of human . rights and public virtue. The article 
concludes by suggesting that the essentially Rawlsian justice-as-
fairness approach could serve as a useful normative ideal for 
judicial decisionmaking. 
L JOHN RAWLS'S A THEORY OF JUSTICE 
The year 1971 marked the publication of A Theory of 
Justice 11 by political philosopher John Rawls.12 A Theory of Justice 
"is a modern classic . . . . [I]ts impact on contemporary legal 
8 Perhaps the timing of Rawls's book, written as it was at essentially the 
same time as Earl Warren wrapped up his Chief Justiceship, indicates that Rawls was 
influenced by the Warren Court's jurisprudence. 
9 See infra Section III.B.2. 
10 The Golden Rule dates to antiquity. Homer identified the idea: "Welcome 
the coming, speed the parting guest!" See HOMER, THE ODYSSEY 31 (Robert Fagles 
trans., Penguin Books 1997). 
11 RAWLS, supra note 7. 
12 Rawls is considered for his work on A Theory of Justice and subsequent 
publications to be "the most important political philosopher of the twentieth century" 
by many. Luke M. Milligan, A Theory of Stability: John Rawls, Fetal Homicide, and 
Substantive Due Process, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1177, ll80 (2007). 
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thinking has been profound," writes one legal scholar.l3 Widely 
cited in law review articles and court opinions, the book has 
provided a unifying approach for many theorists and jurists 
seeking to elevate basic fairness as an integral component of any 
concept of justice.14 
Political philosophers are similarly laudatory. "[P]olitical 
philosophers now must either work within Rawls' theory or 
explain why not,"15 says one. Another adds, '"[f]or us in late 
twentieth century America,' ... [Rawls's approach] 'is our vision, 
the theory most thoroughly embodied in the practices and 
institutions most central to our public life."'16 More broadly, 
Rawls's work has permeated American society at large, much of 
which is sympathetic to the basic thesis that "justice is fairness."17 
Rawls himself explained that his purpose in writing A 
Theory of Justice was to offer an alternative framework for the 
concept of "justice" that was superior to the utilitarian 
approaches that had dominated for the past several centuries 
and had operated largely to the detriment of more egalitarian 
systems of justice.1s Specifically, "the animating philosophical 
idea in A Theory of Justice is that utilitarianism does not take 
rights seriously, and that not taking rights seriously is a grave 
defect, so we need a theory of justice that better fits our core 
convictions about ways people must not be treated."19 
13 Lawrence B. Solum, Situating Political Liberalism, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
549, 550 (1994). 
14 Id.; see also Anita L. Allen, Social Contract Theory in American Case Law, 
51 FLA. L. REV. 1, 2 n.4 (1999) ("[Rawls's] theory has been widely discussed, criticized, 
and applied in diverse scholarly legal and philosophical circles." (citations omitted)); 
Stephen M. Griffin, Reconstructing Rawls's Theory of Justice: Developing a Public 
Values Philosophy of the Constitution, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 715, 776 (1987) (stating that 
"[s]urely one of the reasons for the enthusiastic reception of Rawls's theory among legal 
scholars is that it was perceived as a theory that justified many aspects of the 
American constitutional tradition"). 
15 Milligan, supra note 12, at 1180 (quoting ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, 
STATE, AND UTOPIA 183 (1974)). 
16 Jesse Furman, Political flliberalism: The Paradox of Disenfranchisement and 
the Ambivalences of Rawlsian Justice, 106 YALE L.J. 1197, 1200 (1997) (quoting Michael J. 
Sandel, The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self, 12 POL. THEORY 81, 82 
(1984)); see also Stephen M. Griffm, Political Philosophy Versus Political Theory: The Case of 
Rawls, 69 CHI.·KENT L. REV 691, 691 (1994) (rebutting some political theorists who 
criticized Rawls's theory as irrelevant to the real world of politics). 
17 Milligan, supra note 12, at 1180; see also Peter F. Lake, Liberalism Within 
the Limits of the Reasonable Alone: Developments of John Rawls' Political Philosophy, 
Its Political Positivism, and the Limits on Its Applicability, 19 VT. L. REV. 603, 603-05 
(1995) (stating that Rawls "set in motion a powerful and inspirational force ... A 
Theory of Justice ... (provides an] alternative to various forms of utilitarianism, 
including ... law and economics"). 
1s RAWLS, supra note 7, at xviii. 
19 Richard J. Arneson, Rawls Versus Utilitarianism in the Light of Political 
Liberalism, in THE IDEA OF A POUTICAL LIBERALISM: ESSAYS ON RAWLS (Victoria Davion 
& Clark Wolf eds., 2000). But see Michael I. Swygert & Katherine Earle Yanes, A Unified 
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To that end, Rawls sought to further develop social 
contract theory as originally conceived by the Enlightenment 
theorists John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Immanuel 
Kant.20 To Rawls, the social contract requires that certain 
principles of justice, premised on basic fairness, be applied to 
society's institutions to determine whether those institutions are 
just. Society's institutions establish the basic rules regulating 
civil and criminal procedure, property, the market economy, and 
the family.21 
A. Justice-as-Fairness 
Rawls's A Theory of Justice identifies social justice as 
that which exists in an ideal society where individual citizens 
engage with each other on the egalitarian bases of mutual 
respect and cooperative reciprocity. 22 Rawls explains that 
"justice as fairness [is] a theory of justice that generalizes and 
carries to a higher level of abstraction ... the [concept of] social 
contract."23 At its root, the theory posits an initial position of 
equality which is "designed to lead to an original agreement on 
principles of justice."24 
This justice-as-fairness formulation is composed of two core 
principles: first, "equal basic liberty,"25 and second, the principle 
combining "fair equality of opportunity'' and the "difference 
principle."26 These are principles that reasonable, free people, 
Theory of Justice: The Integration of Fairness into Efficiency, 73 WASH. L. REV. 249, 251 
(1998) (suggesting that justice as fairness and utilitarianism are in fact reconcilable 
because "justice as [fairness] and justice as efficiency [utilitarianism] both theoretically 
result from a consensus. Although each model has its own conditions for bargaining, 
these rules can be selectively combined into a single model" (footnote omitted)). 
20 RAWLS, supra note 7, at xviii; see also Samuel Freeman, Introduction: John 
Rawls-An Overview, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO RAWLS 6-9 (Samuel Freeman 
ed., 2003) (relating Rawls's theory to Lockean and Kantian thought); S.A Lloyd, 
Relativizing Rawls, 69 CHI-KENT L. REV. 709, 735 (1994) (arguing that Rawls's body of 
work withstands criticisms of failing to consider accepted philosophical methods of 
argument); Griffin, supra note 14, at 727-28 (explaining Rawls's suggestion that 
determining what is fair in everyday life requires "considering the justice of the basic 
structure [of society and the social contract] itself' (quoting John Rawls, Kantian 
Constructivism in Moral Theory, 77 J. PHIL. 515, 551 (1980))). 
21 Freeman, supra note 20, at 3. 
22 Responding to critics of Rawls who claim the theory attempts to "level" all 
people, it is the notion of cooperative reciprocity and mutual respect, "not the ideal of 
redressing undeserved inequalities of welfare, resources, or luck, that is at the 
foundation of Rawls's view." Freeman, supra note 20, at 9; see also Nancy Perkins 
Spyke, The Instrumental Value of Beauty in the Pursuit of Justice, 40 U.S.F. L. REV. 
451, 461 (2006) (stating that while "Rawls modified his theory, ... he never. wavered 
from the ideals of reciprocity and mutual respect"). 
23 RAWLS, supra note 8, at 3. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. at 53; see infra note 29 and accompanying text. 
26 RAWLS, supra note 7, at 53; see infra notes 33-34 and accompanying text. 
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looking out for their own interests "would accept in an initial 
position of equality' with others.27 Taken together, Rawls explains, 
the principles advance "values of equal protection and civil liberty; 
fair equality and opportunity; social equality and reciprocity."28 
Under the first principle of equal basic liberty, "each 
person is to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme 
of basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme of liberties 
for others."29 In this context, basic liberties include, in addition 
to political liberty, "freedom of speech and assembly; liberty of 
conscience and freedom of thought, freedom of the person, 
which includes freedom from psychological oppression and 
physical assault and dismemberment (integrity of the person); 
the right to hold personal property and freedom from arbitrary 
arrest and seizure."ao 
Notably, in its attempts to draw constitutional parameters 
for democratic government, Rawls's first principle resembles J.S. 
Mill's principle of liberty.31 Like Mill's "harm principle"-which 
states that "the only purpose for which power can be rightfully 
exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his 
will, is to prevent harm to others"32._Rawls's conception of an 
expansive set of basic liberties captures the sentiment famously 
expressed by U.S. Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis in 1928, 
''The makers of our Constitution ... conferred, as against the 
government, the right to be let alone--the most comprehensive of 
rights and the right most valued by civilized men.":33 
27 RAWLS, supra note 7, at 10 (emphasis added). 
28 Milligan, supra note 12, at 1202 (quoting JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS 
FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 189-90 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001)). 
29 RAWLS, supra note 7, at 53. 
30 /d.; see also Freeman, supra note 20, at 4 ("Freedom and integrity of the 
person" includes "freedom of movement, occupation, and choice of careers, and a right 
to personal property."); Milligan, supra note 12, at 1201-02 (stating that Rawls's basic 
liberties are "the principles that all parties at the original position can agree are 
necessary for political justice; they tend to include, among others, freedom of religion 
and the protection of one's physical integrity" (footnote omitted)). 
31 Freeman, supra note 20, at 4. Basic liberties do not include such matters 
as the "freedom to enter contracts of all kinds, to own weapons, or to accumulate, use, 
and dispose of productive resources as one pleases." !d. 
32 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 13 (Stefan Collini ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 
1989) (1859) ("[There is but] one very simple principle, as entitled to govern absolutely the 
dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and control, ... that the sole 
end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the 
liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which 
power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his 
will, is to prevent harm to others .... The only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is 
amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns 
himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, 
the individual is sovereign."). 
33 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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The second principle states that "social and economic 
inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) 
reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage [fair equality of 
opportunity], and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all 
[difference principle] ."34 In other words, social primary goods 
(such as wealth, income, opportunity, and liberty) may be 
distributed unequally only if such distribution advantages the 
least favored. 35 The difference principle has been especially 
controversial, largely because of this last part-that inequalities 
are tolerated only insofar as they advantage the least favored. 
Some have characterized the difference principle's staunchly-
egalitarian approach as overly radical.36 Others respond that the 
second principle in fact seeks to provide equal opportunities for 
all, which would not actually result in radical redistributions.37 
Under Rawls's hypothetical "original position of 
equality," people should imagine themselves in an unknowing 
state when making decisions affecting other people-that is, 
they should imagine themselves as operating from behind a "veil 
of ignorance."38 No one knows one's own social status, wealth, 
intelligence, fortune, natural skill, and the like.39 Indeed, the 
decision-maker may be among the least advantaged and least 
fortunate. Because "no one is able to design principles to favor 
his particular condition, the principles of justice are the result of 
a fair agreement or bargain."40 In such a scenario, decision-
makers who do not know how they themselves are situated with 
respect to a given matter will be more likely to make decisions 
that are fair to all, including the least privileged.41 
34 RAWLS, supra note 7, at 53, 87; see also Wenar, Leif, John Rawls (Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Winter 2013 Edition), STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Sept. 24, 
2012), plato.stanford.edularchives/win2013/entrieslrawls [http://perma.cd4VNK-37KM) 
(paraphrasing Rawls's two principles). 
"5 See Lawrence B. Solum, To Our Children's Children's Children: The 
Problems of lntergenerational Ethics, 35 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 163, 182 (2001). Rawls 
supplements the theory with two priority rules: "Priority of Liberty" (wherein the first 
principle of equal political liberty takes priority over the second principle of 
socioeconomic equality) and "Priority of Justice over Efficiency and Welfare." ld. at 
180-81; Freeman, supra note 20, at 5. 
36 Griffin, supra note 14, at 739. 
:l7 ld. at 739, 740, 742 (stating that "[t]he second principle of justice ... reduce[s] 
inequalities resulting from social circumstances and natural endowment ... not by 
restricting the natural endowment of the more favored, but by improving the circumstances 
of those less favored by employing the talents of all in a system of mutual benefit'} 
38 RAWLS, supra note 7, at 11. 
:l9 Id. They are allowed to know, however, that they are "heads of families 
and as such are interested in their families' share of primary social goods." April L. 
Cherry, Social Contract Theory, Welfare Reform, Race, and the Male Sex-Right, 75 OR. 
L. REV. 1037, 1057 (1996). 
4o RAWLS, supra note 7, at 11. 
41 Reasonable minds will differ regarding what is adequate consideration for the 
least privileged. Some would require more, others less. This article suggests that the 
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B. Rawls and the Constitution 
Since its unveiling in 1971, Rawls's justice-as-fairness 
theory has received copious attention across disciplines, including 
law.42 Since any legal discussion inevitably traces back to the 
Constitution, it is appropriate to consider justice-as-fairness in 
constitutional terms.43 
Rawls stated, ''The historical experience of democratic 
institutions and reflection on the principles of constitutional 
design suggest that a practicable scheme of liberties can indeed be 
found."44 Principles of constitutional design protect certain 
liberties (primarily through the Bill of Rights and Fourteenth 
Amendment in the United States); however, longstanding 
constitutional practice has developed a "practicable scheme" 
whereby those liberties are, while protected, not absolute. Rawls 
accepts that some limits on basic constitutional rights are 
acceptable to the extent that those limits fit within a larger 
coherent rights framework. For example, "[r]ules of order and 
'time, place, and manner' regulations are all appropriate. Rights 
consideration should provide, at a minimum, subsistence support allowing the least 
privileged to enjoy a life of basic human dignity. In later years, Rawls published several 
additional works, including Political Liberalism (1996) and Justice as Fairness: A 
Restatement (2001), which largely responded to criticisms of various aspects of A Theory of 
Justice. Some of the more recent legal commentary assessing Rawls's subsequent work 
describes a theory that is arguably considerably less robust than that originally envisioned 
in A Theory of Justice. See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, Rawls on Constitutionalism and 
Constitutional Law, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO RAWLS 398 (2003) (suggesting that 
under Rawls's revised theory, such matters as providing basic governmental structure or 
securing core liberties may be resolved through a process of judicial review within 
constitutional law, but that other matters, such as the operation of difference principles, 
would instead be resolved through the political process). But see, e.g., George Klosko, 
Rawls's Argument from Political Stability, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1882-83 (1994) (stating that 
even after Rawls's subsequent works, "certain fundamental ideas [are still] seen as implicit 
in the public political culture of a democratic society"). 
42 See supra notes 12-18 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Elizabeth A. 
Pen do, Substantially Limited Justice?: The Possibilities and Limits of a New Rawls ian 
Analysis of Disability-Based Discrimination, 77 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 225, 235 (2003) 
(stating, "Rawls is often cited in legal literature, and legal scholars have applied his 
methodology to a wide range of issues including welfare rights, tax policy, campaign 
finance, and employment discrimination law" (footnote omitted)). 
43 Rawls suggested: 
The constitution is not what the Court says it is. Rather, it is what the people 
acting constitutionally through the other branches eventually allow the Court 
to say it is. A particular understanding of the constitution may be mandated 
to the Court by amendments, or by a wide and continuing political majority, 
as it was in the case of the New Deal. 
JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 237-38 (1993); see also Bruce A. Antkowiak, 
Saving Probable Cause, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 569, 605 (2007) (quoting and discussing 
Rawls's commentary on the Constitution). 
44 John Rawls, The Basic Liberties and Their Priority, The Tanner Lectures on 
Human Values at the University of Michigan (Apr. 10, 1981), http://tannerlectures.utah. 
edul_documents/a-to-zlr/rawls82.pdf [http://perma.cc/N5L7-SKM3]. 
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may also be restricted, which is to say they may be limited for the 
purpose of securing an even more extensive system of rights."45 
1. Rawls Applied 
Scholars have applied Rawls's justice-as-fairness approach 
to a variety of legal topics. Criminal law and procedure, for 
example, lend themselves well to Rawlsian analysis. This area of 
law-the process for trying defendants and punishing convicted 
offenders-involves the most serious and intrusive exercises of 
governmental power vis-a-vis the individual citizen. If the 
criminal justice system's legitimacy is to be accepted, citizens 
must believe the system is in fact fair and just. This raises a 
conundrum, however, "[f]or wouldn't any citizens, finding 
themselves convicted of crimes and facing punishment, simply 
withhold their agreement as to the just and fair nature of the 
contemplated penalty, whatever its character?"46 
Rawlsian analysis helps resolve this difficulty by allowing 
us to evaluate a penalty as measured against Rawls's two 
principles of justice in order to understand its underlying values. 
''The role of a political conception of justice ... is not to say exactly 
how these questions are to be settled, but to set out a framework 
of thought within which they can be approached."47 In other 
words, while Rawlsian analysis may not answer the question of 
what the law should say, it at least offers an approach for 
assessing what the law actually does say. 
This Rawlsian analysis has been applied in a number of 
other legal contexts as well. For example, Rawlsian principles are 
helpful in discussing matters of intergenerational justice. 
Traditional social contract theory encounters difficulty when 
applied to justice between generations, since it is problematic to 
suggest that the yet unborn are able to "consent" in any meaningful 
way to the terms of any particular agreement or arrangement. By 
contrast, the very abstractness of Rawls's original position 
analysis allows it to circumvent the sorts of knotty issues raised in 
this context by traditional social contract theory.48 
45 Griffin, supra note 14, at 764. According to Griffin, "Rawls envisions two 
sorts of cases: restrictions on the rights of political participation to protect other 
rights ... , and restrictions of an emergency nature necessary to protect the entire 
system of rights in time of war or other constitutional crisis. Both cases are familiar 
enough in our constitutional law." Id.; see also Freeman, supra note 20, at 5 ("[B]asic 
liberties can be limited only for the sake of maintaining other basic liberties."). 
46 Sharon Dolovich, Legitimate Punishment in Liberal Democracy, 7 BUFF. 
CRIM. L. REV. 307, 314 (2004). 
47 JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 12 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001). 
48 Solum, supra note 35, at 207-08; see. also Lawrence Zelenak, Does 
Intergenerational Justice Require Rising Standards of Living?, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1358, 
682 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81:2 
Intergenerational justice also implicates matters of the 
environment and sustainability. One may usefully extend the veil 
of ignorance hypothetical to the issue of intergenerational 
resource conservation. 
[W]here members of society are ignorant about which generation 
they would be born into, they would in the original position, agree 
upon rules that ensure a condition of "permanent livability;" one that 
assures that sufficient resources are available for the sustenance of 
each succeeding generation.49 
It only stands to reason that when people begin to think 
more carefully about how they might personally be affected in 
the future by present-day harmful environmental practices, they 
will be more likely to support efforts to ameliorate the damage 
today. For instance, regarding foreign policy, including self-
defense and the state, from behind the veil of ignorance, we can 
consider whether preemptive strikes may be justified in the face 
of potentially imminent attacks. 5° 
Another area where Rawlsian analysis proves helpful is in 
assessing the law's fairness, over time, to women.51 Even a 
cursory inquiry exposes the failure of the U.S. constitutional 
regime to provide for gender equality over the past two 
centuries.sz While gender equality has markedly improved over 
1363 (2009) (stating that according to Rawls's just savings principle, "[e]ach generation 
must ... put aside in each period of time a suitable amount of real capital accumulation" 
(quoting JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 285 (1971))); see, e.g., Dawn C .. Nunziato, 
Justice Between Authors, 9 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 219, 222 (2002) ("Regulated by a principle of 
intergenerational savings [in copyright law], individual[] [authors] within each generation 
are obliged to forgo immediate gains that are available to them where necessary to protect 
the interests of future generations."). 
49 Alhaji B.M. Marong, From Rio to Johannesburg: Reflections on the Role of 
International Legal Norms in Sustainable Development, 16 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 
21, 42 (2003). 
5o Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Self-Defense and the State, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 
449, 466 (2008) (asking, rhetorically, "Behind the veil of ignorance, would not we all 
agree to limited, humane preemptive strikes for the safety of all?" (quoting Stephen J. 
Morse, Neither Desert Nor Disease, 5 LEGAL THEORY 265, 296 (1999))). 
51 A Theory of Justice has been criticized for its insensitivity to gender concerns. 
"[I]n 1971, [Rawls] did not explicitly list gender as one of the unknowns behind the veil of 
ignorance." Catherine Powell, Lifting our Veil of Ignorance: Culture, Constitutionalism, 
and Women's Human Rights in Post-September 11 America, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 331, 338 
(2005); see also Marion Smiley, Democratic Citizenship v. Patriarchy: A Feminist 
Perspective on Rawls, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1599, 1601-02 (2004) (identifying feminist 
concerns as "first, that that the methodology underlying Rawls's Original Position-
individuation and abstraction-privileges men over women by undermining the values of 
care and relationship; second, that individuals behind the Veil of Ignorance cannot 
produce principles of justice that are powerful enough to challenge the patriarchal family; 
and third, that Rawls's insistence on a Veil of Ignorance takes away from black women 
and other women of color in particular the racial and cultural identities necessary to both 
their moral agency and their personal integrity" (footnotes omitted)). 
52 See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996) (Justice 
Ginsburg, writing for the Court, stated that "[t]hrough a century plus three decades and 
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the past 40 years, work still remains to be done. This work is 
aided by approaching gender questions from behind a Rawlsian 
veil of ignorance, where male and female decision-makers are 
unaware of their gender, and therefore protect, in their own self-
interest, the interests of the less privileged (female) ch_1ss-in case 
they themselves happen to be among the disadvantaged class. 53 
2. Judicial Review 
How does the doctrine of judicial review fare under 
Rawlsian analysis? Since the early days of the Republic, as 
enunciated first by Chief Justice John Marshall in Marbury v. 
Madison, 54 judicial review-the judiciary's review of the actions of 
the equal, elected legislative and executive branches-has become 
an indispensable feature of American constitutionalism.55 Even 
so, in principle, judicial review is controversial. It arguably 
offends basic democratic principles for an unelected group of 
judges to be able to override the actions of duly elected legislative 
more of [our nation's) history, women did not count among voters composing 'We the 
People'; not until 1920 did women gain a constitutional right to the franchise. And for a 
half century thereafter, it remained the prevailing doctrine that government, both federal 
and state, could withhold from women opportunities accorded men so long as any 'basis in 
reason' could be conceived for the discrimination." (footnote omitted) (citation omitted)). 
53 Powell, supra note 51, at 338 (stating that "the principles selected behind a 
veil of ignorance would be more consistent with CEDA W [Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women) than the sex equality 
paradigm that has developed through judicial interpretation of the U.S. Constitution"). 
While Rawls himself was agnostic on the topic of abortion, "he nonetheless left behind 
a coherent theoretical model with which to analyze the justness of policy 
determinations." Milligan, supra note 12, at 1181. Regarding other possible topical 
areas, "[S)ome ... have argued that disability fares well under a Rawlsian analysis 
because, similar to the decision makers in the original position, no one knows if or 
when he or she might become disabled .... " Pendo, supra note 42, at 244; see also 
Karen Halverson Cross, Converging Trends in Investment Treaty Practice, 38 N.C. J. 
INT'L L. & COM. REG. 151, 154-55 (2012) (explaining Rawlsian analysis in the context of 
international investment treaty practices, commenting that negotiating states "are 
moving closer to the 'original position"'). 
54 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
55 The doctrine of judicial review is regarded by some as nothing short of 
America's greatest contribution to constitutional theory. As Professor Bickel puts it, 
Marbury v. Madison ... exerts an enormous magnetic pull. It is, after all, a 
great historic event, a famous victory; and it constitutes, even more than 
victories won by arms, one of the foundation stones of the Republic. It is 
hallowed. It is revered. If it had a physical presence, like the Alamo or 
Gettysburg, it would be a tourist attraction; and the truth is that it very 
nearly does have and very nearly is. 
ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR 
OF POLITICS 74 (1962); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Marbury and the Constitutional 
Mind: A Bicentennial Essay on the Wages of Doctrinal Tension, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 5 
(2003) (stating, "Marbury not only represents the fountainhead of judicial review, but 
also furnishes the canonical statement of the necessary and appropriate role of courts 
in the constitutional scheme"). 
684 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81:2 
and executive officials. Many have expressed this concern, 
including Judge Learned Hand, who vocally favored democratic 
institutions and principles over the "countermajoritarianism" 
inherent in America's practice of broad judicial review. 
[I]t would be most irksome to be ruled by a bevy of Platonic Guardians, 
even if I knew how to choose them, which I assuredly do not. If they 
were in charge, I should miss the stimulus of living in a society where I 
have, at least theoretically, some part in the direction of public affairs. 56 
On the other hand, there are ample reasons why the 
Constitution subjects majoritarian democracy to judicial review. 
Courts are able to give more protection to disfavored individuals 
or minorities who, by definition, are not well represented in a 
majoritarian political process. Moreover, judicial review is able to 
protect core principles and lasting values that ·might tend to get 
lost or minimized in the heat-of-the-moment intensity of political 
conflict.57 Judicial review offers, in short, an important check on 
majorities that would, whether because of their own inherent 
biases, reactionary political responses, or any other reason, 
oppress minorities. 
Indeed, the Founders themselves were well aware of the 
perils of leaving the people's liberties to the whims of direct and 
elected majorities. James Madison, arguing in support of the 
passage of the Bill of Rights before the· First Congress, said, 
"independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a 
peculiar manner the guardians of those rights; they will be an 
impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in the 
[l]egislative or [e]xecutive [branches]."5s In a letter to a French 
correspondent, Thomas Jefferson averred, "[t]he laws of the land, 
administered by upright Judges, would protect you from any 
exercise of power unauthorized by the Constitution of the United 
States."s9 And Alexander Hamilton commented, in Federalist 78, 
as paraphrased by Rebecca Brown, that "the judiciary was 
entrusted with the primary responsibility for guarding the value 
56 LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 73 (1958); see also BICKEL, supra note 
55, at 18 ("[N]othing ... can alter the essential reality that judicial review is a deviant 
institution in the American democracy."). 
57 Archibald Cox, The Independence of the Judiciary: History and Purposes, 
21 U. DAYTON L. REV. 565, 572-73 (1996) (stating that "courts will be a great deal 
firmer and wiser than legislatures in interpreting constitutional guarantees which 
protect essential liberty"); see also Eugene V. Rostow, The Democratic Character of 
Judicial Review, 66 HARV. L. REV. 193, 197 (1952) ("The task of democracy is not to 
have the people vote directly on every issue, but to assure their ultimate responsibility 
for the acts of their representatives, elected or appointed."). 
58 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 439 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834). 
59 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 259-
60 (1924) (quoting Jefferson, VIII, letter to Archibald H. Rowan, Sept. 26, 1798). 
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that underlay the entire constitutional structure: The courts were 
expected to commit to 'inflexible and uniform adherence to the 
rights of the Constitution, and of individuals .... "'so Such 
statements by Madison and Hamilton, primary architects of the 
U.S. Constitution and principle authors of the Federalist Papers-
not to mention statements by Jefferson, primary draftsman of the 
Declaration of Independence--demonstrate judicial review's 
strong pedigree within the American constitutional tradition. 
Under Rawlsian analysis, the doctrine of judicial review 
is neither inherently favored nor disfavored. In Rawls's view, the 
legitimacy of any governmental system-whether it involves 
pure majority rule, a more complex constitutional system with 
legislative, executive, and judicial branches, or some other 
arrangement-ultimately depends on whether the system 
provides adequate protections for the principles of equal basic 
liberty and fair equality of opportunity described in the justice-
as-fairness formulation.s1 
One thing that is possible to say about a Rawlsian 
perspective of judicial review is that it views the judiciary as 
better suited than the legislature to effectuate a fair outcome 
approximating that which would be achieved if decided from 
behind a veil of ignorance. Whereas legislative efforts would 
likely involve complicated formulations and exceptions that 
would test even the most able legislature, constitutional equal 
protection and due process analysis lends itself more easily to an 
inquiry into basic fairness. Judges are sworn to act impartially 
and fairly in the administration of justice-the very same sorts 
of behaviors required of those who would act from behind a 
Rawlsian veil ofignorance.s2 
In sum, Rawls's theory provides strong support for the 
legitimacy of judicial review within the U.S. constitutional 
system. Whatever means best accomplish the end of protecting 
equal liberty and fair equality of opportunity-including judicial 
review-they are justified.s3 
60 Rebecca L. Brown, Accountability, Liberty, and the Constitution, 98 
COLUM. L. REV. 531, 571 (1998) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 441 (Alexander 
Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987)). 
61 Griffin, supra note 14, at 774. 
62 Id. ("Of course, the courts cannot play the same role as the legislature in 
guaranteeing the system of rights. The courts cannot enact legislation or act on their 
own to create cases. Further, Rawls makes it clear that no branch of government has a 
monopoly on constitutional interpretation."). 
63 Id. at 775. 
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II. THE WARREN COURT 
Several hundred feet from the Tomb of the Unknowns at 
the Arlington National Cemetery, about a half-mile from John F. 
Kennedy's eternal flame, rests the grave of Earl Warren. The 
tombstone reads: 
Where there is injustice, we should correct it; where there is poverty, we 
should eliminate it; where there is corruption, we should stamp it out; 
where there is violence we should punish it; where there is neglect, we 
should provide care; where there is war, we should restore peace; and 
wherever corrections are achieved we should add them permanently to 
our storehouse of treasures. 64 
This statement of Warren's personal philosophy, made in 
1972 toward the end of his life, provides insight into how Warren 
approached his work as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court from 
1953 to 1969. The Warren Court holds a special place in 
American history for its bold interpretations of the Constitution's 
mandates for fairness and equality for all. Indeed, the sheer scope 
of the Warren Court's influence approaches that of the 
foundational early-nineteenth-century Marshall Court.65 
Over the course of 16 years, the Warren Court ended de 
jure racial segregation, broadened protections for criminal 
defendants, enhanced voting rights, bolstered freedom of the press 
and freedom of speech, halted the witch hunts for communists, and 
more.66 Unphased by the firestorms of controversy its decisions 
created throughout the nation, the Court was resolute in its 
movement toward greater fairness and equal justice. In adopting 
broad readings of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection 
and Due Process Clauses, the Court embraced a new conception of 
individual rights based on core principles of human dignity.67 
The Warren Court also substantially considered individual 
rights as protected by the First Amendment's grant of freedom of 
speech, including in the context of protests involving civil rights 
groups, the anti-Vietnam War movement, and church-state 
relations.68 Regarding speech, the Justices bolstered protection of 
64 JIM NEWTON, JUSTICE FOR ALL: EARL WARREN AND THE NATION HE MADE 
516-17 (2006); see also Arlington National Cemetery Map, ARLINGTON CEMETERY, 
https://upload. wikimedia.org/wiki pedia/commons/0/07/ Arlington_N a tiona!_ Cemetery_ 
map_-_2013.jpg [http://perma.cc/2HZB-CMD8] (last visited Mar. 4, 2016) (showing the 
relationship of Warren's grave to the cemetery's other landmarks, including President 
Kennedy's flame and the Tomb of the Unknowns). 
65 Scheiber, supra note 2, at 1. 
66 NEWTON, supra note 64, at 11. 
67 Scheiber, supra note 2, at 20. 
68 ld.; see also infra notes 224-248 and accompanying text (discussing the 
Warren Court's First Amendment jurisprudence). 
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expressive conduct and symbolic speech. On the First 
Amendment's religion clauses, the Court embraced a more robust 
conception of the wall of separation between church and state 
than had ever been observed by earlier Courts.69 The principles 
embraced by the Warren Court in these and other cases 
uncannily foreshadowed those later enunciated by John Rawls's 
formulation in 1971. 
A. Chief Justice Earl Warren 
Because the Warren Court's jurisprudence is so closely 
identified with its namesake, it is useful to discuss Earl Warren, 
the man. Warren joined the Court at age 62, appointed as Chief 
Justice by President Eisenhower upon the death of Chief Justice 
Fred Vinson in 1953. Warren was from California, where he had 
served for 10 years as governor, 4 years before that as California 
attorney general, and 14 years before that as Alameda County 
district attorney.7o 
When Warren joined the Court in 1953, America was still 
in many ways an immature work in progress. The decades-old 
paranoia of communism had reached full bloom with the advent 
of the Cold War and McCarthyism, when thousands of Americans 
had their careers and livelihoods destroyed by congressional 
committees bent on rooting out communist sympathizers based on 
the scantest of evidence. Reconstruction's early promise to 
integrate American society had devolved into nearly a century of 
institutionalized racism that continued to diminish the nation's 
moral authority. Earl Warren, who believed the nineteenth-
century Supreme Court had failed in its duty to enforce the 
Fourteenth Amendment's mandate to protect African-Americans 
after the abolition of slavery, knew the twentieth-century 
Supreme Court should be doing more.n 
The Court that Warren would be leading was highly 
polarized. Composed in the mid-1940s of "the most brilliant and 
able collection of Justices who ever graced the high bench 
together," according to Yale law professor Fred Rodell, each of 
69 Scheiber, supra note 2, at 20-21. 
7o CRAY, supra note 1, at 47, 97, 132, 254. 
71 Scheiber, supra note 2, at 16; see, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 
(1896) (upholding the doctrine of "separate but equal," thus opening the door for the 
perpetuation of another 60 years of apartheid throughout the South); see also NEWTON, 
supra note 64, at 3 ("[l]n 1953 [America] remained an immature country in many 
respects. Institutionally sanctioned racism eroded America's moral authority. The Cold 
War and internal debate over Communism ran rivulets of fear and divisiveness 
through the body politic. Spotty respect for the human rights promised to its citizens in 
the Declaration of Independence but withheld from them by its courts undermined 
America's desire to lead the world by example."). 
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whom "possessed ... a peculiarly forceful personality[, and were 
as a group] ... perhaps the most unbrotherly in the Court's 
annals."72 The most prominent Justices of that Court were, on one 
side of the doctrinal divide, Hugo Black and William Douglas, and 
on the other, Felix Frankfurter and Robert Jackson. These 
Justices had deeply opposing views on the role of the Court in 
constitutional interpretation, and Warren's appointment to Chief 
Justice did little to appease this tension. 73 But as Chief Justice, it 
was Warren's responsibility to strike a balance and set the tone 
for the Court.74 Warren excelled in this role. · 
Indeed, by many accounts, Earl Warren was an 
extraordinary leader, and his co-Justices stressed his exceptional 
ability to conduct conferences. "It is incredible how efficiently the 
Chief would conduct the Friday conferences," recounted Justice 
Brennan, ''leading the discussion of every case on the agenda, 
with a knowledge of each case at his fingertips."1s 
Warren was an unapologetic activist in addressing certain 
matters that came before the Court. He was, for example, 
"convinced that his Court had no choice but to assert and enforce 
constitutional mandates for equal protection."76 Yet Warren also 
believed that Congress had an equal responsibility to uphold the 
Constitution. He emphasized that a legislative approach achieved 
through the democratic process was in theory far superior to 
judicial interpretation alone (but only if the legislature exercised 
its power to achieve just outcomes).77 For Warren, it was crucial 
that the legislative and judicial branches shared the task of 
interpreting and upholding the Constitution. 
''The Warren Court, did not always have the luxury, 
however, of sharing the burden."7s Congress was often unwilling, 
or simply unable, to adequately protect citizens' constitutional 
rights from the intrusions of an overweening bureaucracy. 
Professor and former Kennedy administration Solicitor General 
Archibald Cox explained, "the Warren Court's 'activism' was 
deployed mainly in these areas of law and policy, where, in 
[Warren's] opinion as in the Court's view, 'politicians [in Congress 
72 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF: EARL WARREN AND HIS SUPREME 
COURT-A JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY 32 (1983). 
73 Id. "To Frankfurter," professor and biographer Bernard Schwartz explains, 
"the law was almost an object of religious worship-and the Supreme Court its holy of 
holies .... If Frankfurter saw himself as the priestly keeper of the shrine, he looked on 
[Hugo] Black and his supporters, notably [William] Douglas, as false prophets defiling 
hallowed ground." Id. at 40. 
74 Id. at 73. 
75 Id. at 144. 
76 Scheiber, supra note 2, at 15. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
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or the states] were blind to fundamental injustice."'79 Throughout 
the Warren Court years, social activists came to understand that 
their best ally in advancing their policy goals was the Court, not 
state legislatures or Congress. so 
Warren believed that each case before the Court should be 
"evaluated in terms of practical application" and that the Court 
must consider "the human equation, for what we do with our legal 
system will determine what American life will be-not only now 
but in the years ahead .... [L]aw must not be placed in a 
straitjacket of historical precedent."81 As one of Warren's law 
clerks, Curtis Reitz, explained, "He wasn't tied down by doctrine. 
He wasn't into the piddling kinds of distinctions that so box the 
lawyer .... His understanding of hu~an beings, and his 
understanding of social conditions, and the way society and 
government worked, was absolutely extraordinary."s2 Law, as 
Warren explained in a Fortune magazine artiCle, "is simply a 
mature and sophisticated attempt, never perfected, to 
institutionalize this sense of justice and to free men from the 
terror and unpredictability of arbitrary force."83 
Warren admitted that he was not a legal scholar in the 
classic sense; he was, instead, a pragmatist. "I wish that I could 
speak to you in the words of a scholar ... , but it has not fallen 
to my lot to be a scholar in life," he stated in a 1957 speech, "I 
have been in public life for forty years. Since that time, I have 
been doing the urgent rather than the important."s4 Warren's 
lack of any judicial experience prior to coming to the Supreme 
Court allowed his common-sense interest in fairness and equal 
justice to flourish.s5 
But Warren did not disregard the established law. He 
knew there had to be solid authority for ruling a certain way. He 
also knew, however, that one could find a legitimate legal 
argument for virtually any position. 86 Warren looked first to the 
facts of a given case. He decided cases on moral grounds: what 
79 ld. (quoting ARCHIBALD COX, THE WARREN COURT 70 (1968)). 
80 Gordon Silverstein, The Warren Court and Congress, in EARL WARREN ~D 
THE WARREN COURT, supra note 2, at 197. 
81 CRAY, supra note 1, at 317 (quoting Warren). 
82 Id. 
83 Id. (quoting Warren, Fortune magazine). 
B4 SCHWARTZ, supra note 72, at 287; see also CRAY, supra note 1, at 531 
(commenting, "Earl Warren was neither a student of government nor a judicial 
craftsman. Neither was he a legal scholar. He lacked an articulated judicial philosophy 
beyond the penetrating and constant query, 'Is it fair?'"). 
85 Melissa Cully Anderson & Bruce E. Cain, Venturing Onto the Path of 
Equal Representation: The Warren Court and Redistricting, in EARL WARREN AND THE 
WARREN COURT, supra note 2, at 29, 40. 
86 CRAY, supra note 1, at 357. 
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helped the person as well as what would promote a more fair 
society. What Warren cared most about ultimately was who won 
and who lost.s7 Indeed, once, in a 1957 conference, an exasperated 
Felix Frankfurter exclaimed to Warren, "God damn it, you're a 
judge! You don't decide cases by your sense of justice or your 
personal predilections." To which Warren replied with matching 
passion, "Thank heaven, I haven't lost my sense ofjustice."88 
Over time, Frankfurter's clever procedural maneuverings 
alienated Warren, leading Warren to reject overly formalist 
readings of jurisdictional rules.s9 Warren complained that the 
rules were "only binding because Felix says so."90 Warren learned 
from watching Felix Frankfurter that "a judge could do whatever 
he damn pleased .... At least it didn't turn much on whether he 
had a legal basis for it. And so [Warren] didn't give so much of a 
damn about the legal grounds."91 
Justice Frankfurter, by contrast, advocated for judicial 
restraint, and he typically went to considerable lengths to find 
legislative or other official bases for the Court not to hear or 
decide a particular dispute. Above all, Frankfurter believed it was 
inappropriate for a judge to impose his own views on the 
Constitution, on the reasoning that such behavior 1s more 
legislative than judicial in nature. 92 
Frankfurter vehemently opposed Warren's activist, 
equity-based approach.93 Frankfurter's frequent correspondence 
with the esteemed Judge Learned Hand of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit was withering in its criticisms of 
Warren and his activist allies on the Court. Frankfurter 
complained to his fellow Justices as well. "I do not conceive," he 
fumed in a 1957 note to Justice William Brennan, "that it is my 
function to decide cases on my notion of justice and, if it were, I 
wouldn't be as confident as some others that I know exactly 
what justice requires in a particular case .... I envy those for 
whom the dictates of justice are spontaneously revealed."94 For 
87 Id. at 356. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 310. 
9o Id. 
91 Id. (quoting Gunther) (stating also, "[and so t]he Chief struck out on his 
own, ... no longer intimidated by Frankfurter's erudition and his own inexperience"). 
92 SCHWARTZ, supra note 72, at 265. 
93 CRAY, supra note 1, at 307. 
94 SCHWARTZ, supra note 72, at 267. According to Justice Potter Stewart, 
Frankfurter 
was as fickle as a high school girl. I understand ... that, when Earl Warren 
first came to the Court as Chief Justice [in 1953], Felix was going around 
Washington saying, 'This is the greatest Chief Justice since John Marshall 
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his part, a bitter Judge Hand wrote to Frankfurter, "It must be 
damnable ... to be one of a bunch that can never agree, and of 
whom four at any rate regard themselves as Teachers of the 
Four Fold Way and the Eight Fold Path." Elsewhere, Hand 
denigrated '"those Harbingers of a Better World-Black, 
Douglas, Brennan and THE CHIEF' and called the four 'the 
Jesus Quartet,' 'the Jesus Choir,' and 'the Holy Ones.' 'Oh,' he 
declared in still another letter, 'to have the inner certainties of 
those Great Four of your Colleagues!"'95 
Warren believed that the Court had a responsibility to 
enforce constitutional guarantees, and anything less amounted to 
"judicial abnegation."96 Too much judicial restraint, Warren 
believed, had led to the Court's failure to address the many 
problems facing Americans at that time. This judicial neglect had 
created conflict and division in the nation,97 and Warren 
understood the Court's imperative to be to meet the needs of a 
dissenting society by facing those problems head on and according 
to the principles as interpreted by the judiciary.98 To critics who 
accused the Court of "throwing society in a turmoil ... [by] 
look[ing] about for sore spots in the society and proceed[ing] to 
operate upon them," Warren responded: ''That is not how we 
work .... We reflect the burning issues of our society; we do not 
manufacture them .... [T]he times we are living in determine the 
kind of cases we hear."99 And to friends who complained that the 
Court was going too fast, Warren emphasized, "There should be 
no delay in correcting a mistake."too 
Indeed, Warren viewed the Supreme Court as 
something akin to a modern-day Court of Chancery, charged 
with securing equity and fairness in individual cases, especially 
those involving poor, less advantaged, or underprivileged 
parties.to1 During oral arguments, it was not unusual for 
and maybe greater.' And by the time I got here [in 1958, he] had very much 
been disenchanted by the Chief Justice. 
!d. at 147. 
95 !d. at 277-78 (footnotes omitted). Justice Frankfurter's doctrinal approach 
often prevailed in Warren's first decade on the Court. After Frankfurter's 1962 
retirement, however, "it seems Warren's natural leadership skills and fundamental 
commitment to equality 'won over' the rest of the Court.'' Anderson & Cain, supra note 
85, at 43. 
96 SCHWARTZ, supra note 72, at 265. 
97 !d. 
98 CRAY, supra note 1, at 317. 
99 !d. at 462. 
wo ld. at 339. 
lOt SCHWARTZ, supra note 72, at 252, 267. 
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Warren to sit silently, "only to lean forward at the end of an 
argument to ask, 'Yes, but is it {air?"'1o2 
As an illustration of its equitable approach, the Warren 
Court frequently considered the merits when deciding 
employment cases that turned on issues of fact. Warren drew 
upon his personal experience working for the Southern Pacific 
Railroad in his youth (where his father had worked as well) in 
making a special point to protect workers who had suffered 
devastating accidents.l03 He took seriously the Supreme Court's 
role as ·the fmal chance for aggrieved widows and orphans to 
recover under the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA), 
instructing his clerks to regularly take FELA cases in order to 
demonstrate the Court's commitment to enforcing the statute.l04 
The same sensibilities were revealed in Voris v. Eikel, a 
case involving a workers' compensation claim.l05 In Voris, the 
lower court had denied an injured longshoreman's claim because 
he had failed to notify his employer as required by the workers' 
compensation statute. In a short opinion authored by Warren, the 
Court reversed on the ground that the worker's notification of his 
immediate supervisor was adequate to satisfy the statutory 
notification requirements. In the opinion, Warren stated that the 
"Act must be liberally construed ... and in a way which avoids 
harsh and incongruous results."ws Warren's reasoning, essentially 
Rawlsian in its concern for fairness-is typical of Warren's 
equitable approach across the board. 
Additional anecdotes epitomize Warren's passion for 
justice and fairness. Warren's longtime colleague Justice William 
102 CRAY, supra note 1, at 317 (emphasis added). 
1oa SCHWARTZ, supra note 72, at 270-71. 
104 !d. at 271. "Once installed in the Chief's office, [his law clerks] discovered 
their training and honed intelligence were less important to Warren than their 
humanity," Cray reported. "That overriding sense of justice led the Chief to instruct his 
clerks when they were reviewing petitions for certiorari not to keep off petitioners 
'where personal rights are concerned. With property cases, we may be more severe and 
deny cert[iorari]."' CRAY, supra note 1, at 356. 
1os Voris v. Eikel, 346 U.S. 328 (1953). 
106 SCHWARTZ, supra note 72, at 134. The Warren Court's approach in these 
cases is in sharp contrast to that of the modem Supreme Court, where the Court more 
willingly denies recourse. See, e.g., Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber, 550 U.S. 618 
(2007) (barring recovery under claim of gender-based pay discrimination because of 
plaintiff's failure to timely contest, within the statutorily required 180 days, each year's 
disparate salary, even though she only became aware of disparities after many years of 
unequal salaries). Combined with the related issue of the Court's overly expansive 
interpretation of states' sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment (see, for 
example, Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (finding unconstitutional 
Congress's provision in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 allowing 
individual plaintiffs to sue states for age discrimination in employment settings)), these 
cases show a Roberts Court that is demonstrably less friendly to more vulnerable and less 
powerful members of society. 
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Douglas opined, at the time of Warren's death in 1974, that "in 
many ways the lesser cases mirrored the philosophy of the 
man."w7 Schwartz suggested that Warren's character was perhaps 
best exemplified in the 1967 Brooks u. Floridaws case. Brooks 
involved the aftermath of a riot by Mrican-American inmates in a 
Florida prison, where Brooks and the others were placed naked, 
in the Supreme Court's ·words, in a "windowless sweatbox ... a 
barren cage fitted only with a hole in one corner into which he 
and his cell mates could defecate."1o9 Brooks was kept in the cell 
with only the sparsest of rations; when he was removed from the 
cell after two weeks, he signed a confession within minutes-
evidence that was accepted by the Florida Supreme Court in 
affirming his conviction for participating in the riot. Warren was 
angered by the Supreme Court's 8-1 vote to deny certiorari, 
reportedly exclaiming, ''Doggone it! If those guys don't want to 
take this case, I want to be sure that every gruesome detail is 
recorded in those books up there [pointing to the Supreme Court 
Reports] for posterity." Mter sharing a very pointed dissent, 
Warren "'just kind of sat in his office and waited.' In the next 
month, the Justices came in one by one and joined the dissent. By 
the next conference on the case, the Chief had the votes of all, not 
only for the granting of cert, but for summary reversal." no 
So while Justice Frankfurter may have viewed the 
Court as solely a "seat of law," Justice Warren viewed it "as a 
seat of justice.''u1 
B. Equity as a Guiding Principle for the Warren Court 
Underlying virtually every aspect of the Warren Court's 
(and Earl Warren's) jurisprudence was a concern for fairness. 112 
In judicial conference for one of the reapportionment cases,ll3 
for example, Justice Douglas recalls Warren stating that the 
"starting point in this type of case is whether apportionment 
meets standards of republican form of government ... that 
101 SCHWARTZ, supra note 72, at 155-56 (citing Douglas in ABA Journal). 
ws Brooks v. Florida, 389 U.S. 413 (1967). 
109 Id. at 414. 
no SCHWARTZ, supra note 72, at 719-20 (quoting Tyrone Brown, the law clerk 
who worked on the case); see also CRAY, supra note 1, at 446-47 (similarly describing 
Warren's behind-the-scenes efforts in the Brooks case). 
111 GRAY, supra note 1, at 310. 
112 See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text. "Warren distinguished 
himself from his colleagues on the Court by his reliance on intuition, instinct," and 
what Warren's 1963 law clerk Frank Beytagh referred to as "overwhelming dedication 
to fairness." Anderson & Cain, supra note 85, at 44. 
na See infra Section II.C.2. 
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" 
means, is it representative? Is it fairly representative?" 114 
Warren insisted that equality should be the starting point for 
the judiciary in language that John Rawls might have also 
used 10 years later in constructing A Theory of Justice: "Equal 
representation is basic."115 
The Warren Court's fairness jurisprudence was animated 
by the ancient doctrine of equity. Equity as. a concept seems to have 
been first enunciated around 340 B.C. by Aristotle, who 
commented, "For that which is equitable seems to be just, and 
equity is justice that goes beyond the written law."116 Some two 
millennia later, in 1835, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story 
explained: 
In the most general sense, we are accustomed to call that Equity which 
in human transactions, is founded in natural justice, in honesty and 
right, and which properly arises ex aequo et bono .... Equity must have 
a place in every rational system of jurisprudence, if not in name, at least 
in substance. It is impossible, that any code, however minute and 
particular, should embrace, or provide for the infinite variety of human 
affairs, or should furnish rules applicable to all ofthem.l17 
Equity, in short, is a necessary gap filler in any legitimate system 
of laws. 
Equity has a long tradition in American law, with its 
antecedent in English law. In England, the concept began to take 
shape as early as the Norman period (the eleventh and twelfth 
centuries) with the formation of the Curia Regis, or King's Court. 
"It is to be understood that the King's Court was a sure asylum 
for the oppressed,"us authoritative histories instruct. Over the 
following centuries, the Court of Chancery's caseload increased, 
and it became dramatically influential. In the process, it sparked 
long-standing turf wars between itself and Courts of Law-until 
114 Anderson & Cain, supra note 85, at 44. 
115 I d. at 44, 45; see also Vicki C. Jackson, The Early Hours of the Post- World 
War II Model of Constitutional Federalism: The Warren Court and the World, in EARL 
WARREN AND THE WARREN COURT, supra note 2, at 137, 157 (commenting that the 
Reynolds v. Sims reapportionment decision's "one-person, one vote principle was 
accessible to the popular sense of fairness"). See infra notes 149-171 and accompanying 
text for discussion of reapportionment cases. 
116 GARY L. MCDOWELL, EQUITY AND THE CONSTITUTION 5 (1982) (quoting 
ARISTOTLE, MAGNA MORALIA (Loeb Classical Library ed., G. Cyril Armstrong trans., 
Harvard University Press 1935)); see also HENRY L. MCGLINTOCK, MCCLINTOCK ON 
EQUITY 1-23 (1936) (referencing equity's historical roots). 
117 JOSEPH STORY, 1 COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, AS 
ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES§ 56-58, at 62-65 (Arno 1972). 
118 A. H. MARSH, HISTORY OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY AND OF THE RISE AND 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINES OF EQUITY 12 (1890) (quoting 1 MADOX' HISTORY OF 
THE EXCHEQUER 120 (1711)). 
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its dissolution and merger with those Courts of Law in 1875.119 "In 
the course of time the Chancellor ... came to be called the keeper 
of the King's conscience."120 The Chancery was considered to be 
"the secret closett of his Majesty's conscience where his oppressed 
and distressed subjects hope to find mercy and mitigation against 
the rigour and extremitye of his lawes."121 Or, as Lord Chancellor 
Ellesmere explained, Chancery "is the refuge of the poor and 
afflicted, it is the altar and sanctuary for such as against the might 
of rich men and the countenance of great men, [who] cannot 
maintain the goodness of their cause and the truth of their title."122 
In the United States (and the colonies before them), after a 
slow start, equity began to have a place in the Enlightenment 
theory that culminated around the end of the eighteenth century, 
explained Justice Joseph Story in his highly influential 1835 
work, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence (cited by, among 
many others, Abraham Lincoln). 123 As for its nature, equity 
originates from the same sources as in England, and it is applied 
in much the same manner. As Story notes: ''The Constitution of 
the United States has ... conferred on the National Judiciary 
cognizance of cases in Equity, as well as in Law; and the uniform 
interpretation of the clause has been, that ... Equity 
Jurisprudence embraces the same matters of jurisdiction and 
modes of remedy, as exist in England."124 
119 ld. at 47-48. Among the objections to Chancery were those of subjectivity, 
as expressed famously by the seventeenth-century jurist John Selden: 
Equity is a roguish thing; for law we have a measure and know what to trust 
to. Equity is according to the conscience of him that is Chancellor; and as that 
is larger or narrower, so is equity. 'Tis all one as if they should make the 
standard for the measure the Chancellor's foot. What an uncertain measure 
would this be? One Chancellor has a long foot, another a short foot; a third an 
indifferent foot. It is the same thing with the Chancellor's conscience. 
!d. at 103-04. 
12o !d. at 14; see also DENNIS R KLINCK, CONSCIENCE, EQUITY AND THE COURT 
OF CHANCERY IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND 1-2 (2010). 
121 MARSH, supra note 118, at 14-15 (quoting Hargrave's Law Tracts, 427). 
122 !d. at 48. See generally CANDACE S. KOVACIC-FLEISCHER ET AL., EQUITABLE 
REMEDIES, RESTITUTION AND DAMAGES 2-8 (8th ed. 2011). 
12:! STORY, supra note 117, at 62-63. In a September 25, 1860, letter to an 
aspiring lawyer, Abraham Lincoln wrote: 
Dear Sir: ... The mode [of learning the law] is very simple, though laborious, and 
tedious. It is only to get the books, and read, and study them carefully. Begin with 
Blackstone's Commentaries, and after reading it carefully through, say twice, 
take up Chitty's Pleadings, Greenleaf's Evidence, & Story's Equity &c. in 
succession. Work, work, work, is the main thing. Yours very truly A. Lincoln. 
http://www.abrahamlincolnonline.org/lincolnlspeechesllaw.htm [http://perma.cdEJ8S-XXRN] 
(last visited Mar. 4, 2016). 
124 KOVACIC-FLEISCHER ET AL., supra note 122, at 64-65. 
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Specifically, Courts of Equity are not as constrained as 
Courts of Law. While they have certain prescribed procedures, 
Courts of Equity may adjust their approaches to fit the needs of 
different cases. They may model the remedy and adjust the rights 
of all interested parties, whereas common law courts must confine 
their reach to the parties in the instant case.125 Moreover, a Court 
of Equity's jurisdiction may extend to those instances "where the 
principles of law, by which the ordinary courts are guided, give no 
right, but, upon the principles of universal justice, the 
interference of the judicial power is necessary to prevent a wrong, 
and the positive law is silent."12s 
More recently, McClintock on Equity explains, "Equity 
jurisdiction may attach [in the United States] in almost any field 
of the law, where the circumstances may call for the exercise of its 
peculiar powers."127 A recently published casebook on equitable 
remedies adds that equitable doctrines "have continuing vitality 
insofar as they inspire judges to consider themselves as being 
bound by a higher obligation."12s Moreover, it states, ''Modern 
judges ... exercising 'equitable jurisdiction,' like the early 
chancellors, feel less constricted in their application of precedents 
than do their counterparts who are exercising jurisdiction over 
claims for legal relief."129 
The principle that courts in the United States have wide 
latitude to offer equitable relief has long been recognized by the 
Supreme Court. In an 1869 contract case, for example, the Court 
announced that "relief ... is a matter resting in the discretion of 
the court [of equity], to be exercised upon a consideration of all the 
circumstances of each particular case."130 Nearly 100 years later, 
the Warren Court embraced equitable principles in the landmark 
case of Brown v. Board of Education when it announced that "[i]n 
fashioning and effectuating the decrees, the courts will be guided 
by equitable principles . . . . These cases call for the exercise of 
these traditional attributes of equity power," and "[c]ourts of 
equity may properly take into account the public interest in the 
12s Id. § 28, at 27·28. 
126 Id. § 32, at 30·31 (quoting Lord Redesdale); see also MCCLINTOCK, supra 
note 116, at 29, 52-53 (citing 1 POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AND 
EQUITABLE REMEDIES § 363 (4th ed. 1918)) (describing certain "maxims of 
equity ... that guide courts of equity in the exercise of their discretion"). 
127 MCCLINTOCK, supra note 116, at 60. See generally KOVACIC-FLEISCHER ET 
AL., supra note 122, at 8-11. General courts of law could hear both law and equity cases 
beginning around the 1850s. In 1938, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure merged law 
and equity. Many courts of law thereafter embraced the more flexible equity court 
procedures. Id. 
12s KOVACIC-FLEISCHER ET AL., supra note 122, at 11. 
129 Id. at 12. 
· 130 Willard v. Tayloe, 75 U.S. (8 Cranch) 557, 565 (1869). 
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elimination of such obstacles in a systematic and effective 
manner."131 
In sum, the fairness jurisprudence of the sort practiced 
by the Warren Court and as promoted by John Rawls's original 
position theory has a long history in the Anglo-American legal 
tradition. The next section examines the specific constitutional 
bases for the Court's equity-based approach. 
C. Constitutional Bases: Equal Protection 
The Warren Court accomplished much of its work by 
breathing life into the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection 
and Due Process Clauses-provisions the Court read as 
essentially providing for fair, equitable outcomes. Earl Warren's 
position regarding equal protection and due process "rested on his 
profound belief that America's highest court must interpret the 
Constitution in light of 'the evolving standards of decency that 
mark the progress of a maturing society."'132 Warren believed that 
the Constitution's provisions for the Court's role were not '"hollow 
shibboleths' but rather must be continuously evaluated and 
advanced as 'living principles."'133 
Regarding the Equal Protection Clause, the Warren 
Court's jurisprudence revolutionized what it meant to enjoy 
"equal protection of the laws" in America. During the nearly 
hundred years following the Fourteenth Amendment's ratification 
in 1868, the Court refused to consider that the clause--once 
derided by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes as "the usual last 
resort of constitutional arguments"134-might embrace anything 
beyond official racial discrimination. And even then, the Court 
interpreted the clause very narrowly, holding in Plessy v. 
Ferguson in 1896 that laws requiring separation of the races did 
not technically violate the letter of the Equal Protection Clause, 
so long as alternate facilities were "equal."135 Beginning with its 
first landmark decision, Brown v. Board of Education, however, 
the Warren Court transformed the clause into what is now a 
robust provision protecting not only against racial discrimination 
131 Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955) [hereinafter 
Brown II] (emphasis added); see also infra notes 139-148 and accompanying text 
(discussing Brown v. Board of Education). 
132 Scheiber, supra note 2, at 20. 
133 ld. 
134 Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 539 (1942) (citing 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes's opinion for the Court in Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 
208 (1927)). 
135 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
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but also against a broad range of other forms of injustice, 
including discriminatory practices involving voting rights. 136 
1. School Desegregation Cases 
The first major case of Earl Warren's tenure as Chief 
Justice, Brown v. Board of Education,131 dramatically and 
fundamentally altered how the Supreme Court would treat 
racially discriminatory practices, effectively putting to an end the 
system of institutionalized apartheid that had existed in the 
United States since the Court's "separate but equal" Plessy 
decision. 138 The Court in Brown concluded that Plessy's separate-
but-equal doctrine allowing racial segregation in schools denied 
equal educational opportunities to minority children and 
accordingly found such practices unconstitutional under the 
Equal Protection Clause. Writing for a unanimous Court, Chief 
Justice Warren reasoned, 
In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 
when the Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. 
Ferguson was written. We must consider public education in the 
light of its full development and its present place in American life 
throughout the Nation. Only in this way can it be determined if 
segregation in public schools deprives these plaintiffs of the equal 
protection of the laws_l39 
Appealing to notions of basic fairness (in terms resembling 
those later expressed in John Rawls's "original position of 
equality" theory), the Court concluded that "these days, it is 
doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed 
in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an 
opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a 
right which must be made available to all on equal terms."I4o 
Of course, putting an end to deeply ingrained, centuries-
old segregation practices would not simply be a matter of 
136 See infra Section II.C.2. 
137 Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 349 U.S. 294 (1955); see also, e.g., Loving v. 
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (striking down state laws prohibiting interracial marriage). 
138 Sheila Foster, Race, Agency, and Equal Protection: A Retrospective on the 
Warren Court, in EARL WARREN AND THE WARREN COURT, supra note 2, at 77-78; see 
also Scheiber, supra note 2, at 3 (stating, "[Brown] served to redefine dramatically the 
constitutional imperatives of equal protection"). After Brown, the Court has expanded 
the Equal Protection Clause's reach beyond race to also include gender (Craig v. Boren, 
429 U.S. 190, 197-98 (1976)); national origin (Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 
214, 216 (1944)); alienage (Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971)); and 
children of unmarried parents (Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461-62 (1988)); see also 
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 713 (4th ed. 
2011) (summarizing the Court's equal protection doctrine). 
139 Brown, 347 U.S. at 492-93. 
140 ld. 
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declaring such practices unconstitutional. A Court-ordered 
remedy would also be necessary; accordingly, the Supreme Court 
carried over to the next year, 1955, the question of what would 
be the proper approach for effectuating the desegregation of 
schools. In the follow-up case, Brown v. Board of Education 
(Brown 11), 141 the Court remanded the cases to the federal 
district courts that had originally heard the cases, explaining 
that "[s]chool authorities have the primary responsibility for 
elucidating, assessing, and solving these problems[, but] courts 
will have to consider whether the action of school authorities 
constitutes good faith implementation of the governmg 
constitutional principles."142 The Court looked squarely and 
expressly to the judiciary's power of equity: 
In fashioning and effectuating the decrees, the courts will be guided by 
equitable principles. Traditionally, equity has been characterized by a 
practical flexibility in shaping its remedies and by a facility for adjusting 
and reconciling public and private needs. These cases call for the 
exercise of these traditional attributes of equity power. At stake is the 
personal interest of the plaintiffs in admission to public schools as soon 
as practicable on a nondiscriminatory basis. To effectuate this interest 
may call for elimination of a variety of obstacles .... Courts of equity 
may properly take into account the public interest in the elimination of 
such obstacles in a systematic and effective manner. 143 
Among the remarkable aspects of Brown was that it was a 
unanimous decision. According to Justice William Douglas's 
memoirs, when the case had first been argued before the Supreme 
Court only the previous. year (then led by Chief Justice Fred 
Vinson), it seemed likely that the Court would vote 5-4 to uphold 
the separate-but-equal doctrine. Reaction to the Court's decision-
especially the unanimity-was one of shocked surprise.l44 For his 
part, Warren credited the three Southern Justices. "Don't thank 
me," he advised a friend, "I'm not the one. You should see what 
those ... fellows from the southern states had to take from their 
constituencies. It was absolutely slaughter. They stood right up 
and did it anyway because they thought it was right."145 
Brown was met with massive resistance. State officials 
opposed desegregation in myriad ways. They claimed, for 
example, that the Court's mandate was simply not binding-that 
t4t Brown II, 349 U.S. 294. 
142 !d. at 299. 
143 !d. at 300 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). 
144 CRAY, supra note 1, at 287 (stating that, upon announcing the decision, 
"Warren sensed more than heard a collective gasp from the people in the courtroom, 'a 
wave of emotion' without sound or movement, 'yet a distinct emotional manifestation 
that defies description"'). 
145 SCHWARTZ, supra note 72, at 106. 
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their legislatures could pass measures of "nullification" and 
"interposition," invalidating Court decisions they believed were 
unconstitutional. The Court resoundingly rejected these 
arguments in Cooper u. Aaron, 146 just as it had done in a series of 
cases in the pre-Civil War era a century earlier.l47 Nonetheless, 
true progress in desegregation did not occur for a full decade or 
more after Brown-but in the end, the equal opportunity 
mandate prevailed.t4s 
2. Reapportionment Cases 
All too often throughout the nation's history, legislatures 
have enacted voting regulations and restrictions that have 
disproportionately affected and effectively disenfranchised poor 
and vulnerable citizens, often from racial minority groups.t49 
These barriers on voting have only compounded the separate, 
longstanding problem of rampant malapportionment and racial 
gerrymandering, which have resulted in the underrepresentation 
of racial minorities in both state legisl~tures and Congress.15° 
In the early 1960s, as it tackled malapportionment, the 
Warren Court looked to the newly robust post-Brown Equal 
Protection Clause. Until the Warren Court issued its landmark 
Baker u. Carr151 and Reynolds u. Sims152 decisions in 1962 and 
1964, for many decades, the Supreme Court stood mutely by on 
malapportionment issues. Baker and Reynolds established the 
146 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) (unanimously repudiating the State 
of Arkansas's arguments in refusing to integrate Little Rock schools). 
147 See, e.g., Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 514, 525-26 (1859) (rejecting 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court's attempt to repudiate the federal Fugitive Slave Act). 
148 By 1964, only 1.2% of black children in the South were attending school with 
whites. By contrast, by 1968 (as aided greatly by the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which both 
authorized the U.S. Attorney General to intervene against laggard school districts and 
tied receipt of federal education funds to compliance with the desegregation mandate), 
32% of districts were desegregated (by 1973, 91% were desegregated). CHEMERINSKY, 
supra note 138, at 741-42. 
149 See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 115, at 154-55 ("Malapportionment, as it 
existed in many states, was severe, reinforcing racial inequalities as blacks moved to 
cities, and ... [was] completely lacking in a foreseeable political remedy. Such a system 
was not only inconsistent with fundamental commitments to equality in voting, or to 
the idea that there were some bases on which it was impermissible to deny a vote, but 
with the character of the U.S. Constitution as a representative democracy."). 
150 Indeed, both of these problems have recently reemerged in the current Roberts 
Court's decisions in such cases as Crawford v. Marien County Election Board, 553 U.S. 181 
(2008) (upholding a state law requiring all voters to show a photo identification) and Shelby 
County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (effectively striking down section 5 of the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965 requiring certain jurisdictions to receive preclearance from the Justice 
Department before changing voting laws or district boundaries). 
151 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (finding redistricting cases justiciable). 
152 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (striking down malapportionment). 
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now-axiomatic "one person, one vote" principle153_that one 
person's vote in any election should be counted with the same 
weight as any other person's vote-as a core element of fair 
elections in a democracy. 
Baker involved a claim by Tennessee voters that a state 
apportionment statute used an irrational, unreasonable formula 
for assigning representatives to the state legislature, thus 
violating plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment equal protection and 
due process rights. Not surprisingly, in the district court, the case 
was found nonjusticiable and dismissed, since matters involving 
apportionment had long been held by the Court to be nonjusticiable 
political questions under the Constitution's Guaranty Clause, 
which expressly left such matters solely to Congress,154 even when 
state apportionment schemes are blatantly discriminatory. In the 
1946 case Colegrove v. Green, for example, Justice Felix 
Frankfurter explained (in denying review of an Illinois 
malapportionment where counties with populations of 1,000 and 
100,000 would each be entitled to one representative), "If 
Congress failed ... , whereby standards of fairness are offended, 
the remedy ultimately lies with the people."1ss 
Justice' Brennan's opinion for the Court some 16 years 
later in Baker, by contrast, concluded that in determining 
whether a state apportionment system violates the Fourteenth 
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause (as opposed to the Article 
IV Guaranty Clause), none of the traditionally recognized political 
question factors-including "textually demonstrable constitutional 
commitment [to another political branch],"156 which had been the 
justification in the Guaranty . Clause cases-apply. "Judicial 
standards under the Equal Protection Clause are well developed 
and familiar," the Court explained, "and it has been open to courts 
153 Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 558 (quoting Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963)). 
154 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 4 ("The Times, Places and Manner of holding 
Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the 
Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such 
Regulations .... "); U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (Guaranty Clause) ("The United States 
shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and 
shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on application of the Legislature, or of 
the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence."). 
See Baker, 369 U.S. at 217, for the Court's full elucidation of political question factors. 
The first factor, at issue here, designates as nonjusticiable political questions those 
matters where there is a "textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the 
issue to a coordinate political department." Id. 
155 Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 554 (1946); see also South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 
276, 277 (1950) (similarly finding nonjusticiable a matter involving state electoral 
apportionment). 
156 Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. 
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since the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment to determine" 
whether a particular law violates the clause.l57 
The Baker majority's sea change away from a long 
history of judicial passivity on the apportionment issue was 
met with powerful resistance by Justice Frankfurter.l58 
Frankfurter castigated the majority's new position in a note to 
Justice John Harlan after the conference discussion: "What 
powerfully emerged for me this afternoon ... is that men who 
so readily impose their will on the nation and the fifty states by 
exultingly overruling their most distinguished predecessors 
behave like subservient children when lectured by a martinet 
with a papa-knows-best-for-the-best complacency."159 Regarding 
the decision itself, Frankfurter warned that it would leave the 
courts in a "mathematical quagmire," with little legal basis on 
which to proceed.t6o 
Two years later, in Reynolds v. Sims, with the 
justiciability barrier having been removed by Baker, the Court 
then considered and struck down an Alabama apportionment 
system in which Alabama failed, over the course of many decades 
of shifting populations, to redistrict as required by the state 
constitution. This resulted in a gross malapportionment that 
disadvantaged black voters. Chief Justice Warren explained: 
The right to vote freely for the candidate of one's choice is of the essence 
of a democratic society, and any restrictions on that right strike at the 
heart of representative government. And the right of suffrage can be 
denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen's vote just as 
effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise ofthe franchise.l61 
The Chief Justice further explained: 
Legislators represent people, not trees or acres .... It would appear 
extraordinary to suggest that a State could be constitutionally permitted 
to enact a law providing that certain of the State's voters could vote two, 
five, or 10 times for their legislative representatives, while voters living 
elsewhere could vote only once. And it is inconceivable that a state law 
to the effect that, in counting votes for legislators, the votes of citizens in 
one part of the State would be multiplied by two, five, or 10, while the 
votes of persons in another area would be counted only at face value, 
could be constitutionally sustainable. Of course, the effect of state 
157 Id. at 226. 
158 Anderson & Cain, supra note 85, at 35. 
159 SCHWARTZ, supra note 72, at 424. 
160 Id. at 424-25. 
1s1 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964); see also Gray v. Sanders, 372 
U.S. 368, 381 (1963) (stating, "The conception of political equality from the Declaration 
of Independence, to Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and 
Nineteenth Amendments can mean only one thing--one person, one vote"); Wesberry v. 
Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964} (holding unconstitutional a Georgia districting system). 
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legislative districting schemes which give the same number of 
representatives to unequal numbers of constituents is identical.162 
703 
In short, the Court concluded that the Equal Protection Clause 
guarantees all voters equal participation in elections. 163 
The Reynolds opinion, which Justice William Brennan 
later suggested was driven by Warren's core sense of fairness, 16 4 
hit with breathtaking force.l65 For traditionalists, "[t]he outcry 
was immediate and pained." The Court '"finished its work of 
completely devastating one of the most basic and one of the most 
revered concepts of American constitutional government, 
[federalism],"'166 claimed Missouri Democrat Richard !chord. New 
Yorh Times columnist Arthur Krock lamented the decision as 
misguided, an 
expression of the philosophy that the Constitution implicitly 
provides for the correction of any social or political condition that a 
majority of the Court deems undesirable and endows the Court with 
power to take the functions of another branch of Government when 
that branch fails to act.I67 
Many others, however, believed the Court to be well 
justified, urging critics to remember that the Court stepped in 
to answer the apportionment question only after the states had 
utterly failed to fairly consider the issue. It was left to the 
Court, therefore, with its unique standing within the federalist 
regime, to correct a deep injustice to core voting rights.168 
Warren himself never doubted the propriety of the "one 
person, one vote" mandate. "If Baher had been in existence 50 
162 Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 562-63. 
16
" !d. at 567. Reynolds specified, moreover, that the one person, one vote principle 
applies to both the lower and upper chambers in a bicameral state legislature. !d. at 575-76. 
164 CRAY, supra note 1, at 435 (quoting Justice Brennan, "Possessed of an 
equal right to vote, the least of us, [Warren] thought, would be armed with an effective 
weapon needed to achieve a fair share of the benefits of our free society"). 
165 Anderson & Cain, supra note 85, at 47 ("[O]ne journalist at the time 
likened being in the Court on the day Reynolds was announced to 'being present at the 
second American Constitutional Convention.' Even liberals and academics, warm to the 
Warren Court, he continued, were 'stunned."' (footnote omitted) (quoting LUCAS A. 
POWE JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 25? (2000))). 
166 CRAY, supra note 1, at 435 (quoting Rep. Richard !chord). 
167 SCHWARTZ, supra note 72, at 507 (quoting Arthur Krock); see also CRAY, 
supra note 1, at 435 (quoting Senator Barry Goldwater, who made the Supreme Court 
a political issue in his presidential campaign, "] would be very, very worried about who 
is president the next four or eight years, thinking of only one thing-the makeup of the 
Supreme Court" (quoting Sen. Barry Goldwater)). 
168 Jackson, supra note 115, at 141 & n.ll (citing ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, 
THE SUPREME COURT FROM TAIT TO WARREN 239-40 (1968) (stating the "Court's 
reapportionment cases (were] prompted by 'necessity"')); see also MARTIN M. SHAPIRO, 
LAW AND POLITICS IN THE SUPREME COURT 247 (1964) (stating, "[l]t should be 
remembered ... that the Court did not act in the apportionment area until long after 
the states had shown themselves totally incapable of doing the job"). 
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years ago, we would have saved ourselves acute racial troubles. 
Many of our problems would have been solved a long time ago," 
he asserted, in terms John Rawls might have later used in his 
own justice-as-fairness theory, "if everyone had the right to 
vote, and his vote counted the same as everybody else's. Most of 
these problems could have been solved through the political 
process rather than through the courts. But as it was, the 
Court had to decide." 169 Indeed, Warren later said that he 
considered the reapportionment cases to be "his Court's single 
most profound contribution to the law ... because only with 
equality in voting could the political system live up to the 
nation's ideal of democratic elections and lawmaking." 170 
In sum, Baker and Reynolds were enormously 
influential. As Justice William Douglas recalled in his 
autobiography, 36 states had reformed their apportionment 
schemes by 1970. When combined with the Voting Rights Act of 
1965, the Court's attention to reapportionment resulted in 
changes to 90% of U.S. congressional districts and to virtually 
all state legislative districts. 171 
D. Constitutional Bases: Due Process 
The Warren Court also embraced a more expansive 
reading of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, 
which states, "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law."172 Under the 
Warren Court's jurisprudence, the Due Process Clause would 
now proscribe, via the incorporation doctrine, a much broader 
range of state conduct vis-a-vis Bill of Rights protections, and 
would begin offering heightened recognition to other 
enumerated and unenumerated individual rights, as well. 
1. Incorporation and the Bill of Rights 
Another way the Warren Court greatly bolstered fairness 
for all Americans was in recognizing that most of the separate 
provisions in the Bill of Rights apply not only to the federal 
government, but also to state (and local) governments. In so 
1ss SCHWARTZ, supra note 72, at 508. 
170 Scheiber, supra note 2, at 3. 
171 Anderson & Cain, supra note 85, at 47; see also CRAY, supra note 1, at 437 
("Reynolds, coupled with the Voting Rights Act of 1965, had redrawn the political 
landscape. In Congress and state legislatures alike, long-tenured incumbents found 
their safe rural districts redrawn to accommodate urban and suburban growth. Many 
chose to announce their retirement." (footnote omitted)). 
172 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ 1. 
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doing, the Court showed sensitivity to, among other things, the 
exceedingly vulnerable position of criminal defendants in the face 
of a powerful prosecuting government. 
Many are surprised to learn that the Bill of Rights-
roughly 28 protections contained in the first 10 amendments 
that protect many of Americans' most dearly held liberties and 
rights against governmental infringement17a_did not always 
apply to the state governments. Specifically, by their terms, the 
protections encompassed within the Bill of Rights apply only 
against the federal government.l74 
The Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities 
Clause (stating, "No State shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States")175 was intended to correct this shortcoming by applying 
those protections against state and local governmentsPs The 
Supreme Court, however, effectively read the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause out of the Constitution in 1873 in the 
Slaughter-House Cases, 177 just five years after the Fourteenth 
173 Id. amends. I-VIII. The 28 protections in the Bill of Rights are found within 
the following amendments: U.S. CONST. amend. I (rights of freedom of expression and 
. freedom of press, of free exercise of religion, of assembly, of petition; right against 
government establishment of religion); U.S. CONST. amend. II (right to keep and bear 
arms); U.S. CONST. amend. III (rights against quartering soldiers in times of peace, and 
in times of war); U.S. CONST. amend. IV (rights against unreasonable search and 
seizure, against warrants without probable cause); U.S. CONST. amend. V (rights of 
criminal grand jury, of due process; rights against being twice charged for same crime, 
against self-incrimination, against takings of property); U.S. CONST. amend. VI (rights 
of speedy trial, of public trial, of impartial jury in district where crime occurred, of 
being informed of crime, of confronting witness against, of calling witnesses in favor, of 
assistance of counsel); U.S. CONST. amend. VII (rights of civil jury, of reexamination of 
facts only under common law rule); U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (rights against excessive 
bail, against excessive fines, against cruel and unusual punishment). 
174 See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250-51 (1833). The 
amendments constituting the Bill of Rights were proposed in 1789 and ratified in 1791, 
two years after the Constitution's ratification. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: 
CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 3, 8 (1998). 
175 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
176 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866) (quoting Senator 
Jacob Howard, chair of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, on May 24, 1866, 
"[Section 1 is intended to impose a] general prohibition upon all the States, as such, from 
abridging the privileges and immunities of the citizens of the United States .... To these 
privileges and immunities, whatever they may be-for they are not and cannot be fully 
defined in their entire extent and precise nature-to these should be added the personal 
right guarantied and secured by the first eight amendments of the Constitution; such as 
the freedom of speech ... [and] the right to keep and to bear arms"). Similarly, 
Representative John Bingham, Section l's sponsor in the House, repeatedly explained 
that the Privileges or Immunities Clause would encompass '"the bill of rights'-a phrase 
he used more than a dozen times in a key speech on February 28." AMAR, supra note 174, 
at 182. In response to John Bingham's strong statements in the House, nobody spoke up 
to disagree with him. Id. at 187 (stating further, "[s]urely, if the words of section I meant 
something different, this was the time to stand up and say so"). 
177 Butchers' Benevolent Ass'n of New Orleans v. Crescent City Livestock 
Landing & Slaughter-House Co. (Slaughter-House Cases), 83 U.S. 36 (1872). 
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Amendment's ratification. 178 For many decades, therefore, states 
were allowed to continue abridging certain individual rights that 
would be protected but for the fact that it was a state, and not the 
federal government, abridging the rights. 
Gradually, the Supreme Court began considering whether 
states might be depriving persons of "life, liberty, or property'' in 
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. 179 
The first time the Court expressly applied a Bill of Rights 
provision to the states through the Due Process Clause was in the 
1925 case, Gitlow v. New York. 180 There, the Court found that the 
First Amendment rights of freedom of speech and of the press 
were "fundamental personal rights and 'liberties'" that could not 
be impaired by the actions of the states.lB1 
The Supreme Court incorporated several more 
constitutional provisions in the following decades.182 The Warren 
Court began applying more provisions from the Bill of Rights to 
the states through its "selective incorporation" doctrine, which 
itself took a relatively more objective, searching look at the 
history of Reconstruction and the Fourteenth Amendment than 
that taken under the Court's earlier approach. Selective 
incorporation posed as the proper question for analysis whether a 
178 For descriptions of how the Supreme Court arguably improperly found that 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause does not apply the Bill of Rights to the states, see, 
for example, Michael Anthony Lawrence, Second Amendment Incorporation Through 
the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities and Due Process Clauses, 72 Mo. 
L. REV. 1, 27-35 (2007); Michael Anthony Lawrence, The Potentially Expansive Reach of 
McDonald v. Chicago: Enabling the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 2010 CARDOZO L. 
REV. DE NOVO 139, 141-49 (2010); see also Michael Anthony Lawrence, Rescuing the 
Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities Clause: How "Attrition of 
Parliamentary Processes" Begat Accidental Ambiguity; How Ambiguity Begat 
Slaughter-House, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 445, 447 (2009) (suggesting the 
ambiguity regarding "U.S. citizenship" versus "state citizenship" in the first two 
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1, was the result of a circumstantial 
accident during the congressional drafting process). 
179 See, e.g., Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 
226, 241 (1897) (regarding the Due Process Clause's protection against state 
infringement of property rights); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 99-101 (1908) 
(regarding the Due Process Clause's protection against state infringement of Bill of 
Rights generally). 
ISO Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). 
181 Id. at 666 (citation omitted). 
182 Bill of Rights provisions incorporated before the 1953 beginning of the 
Warren Court era include the First Amendment's religion, press, and assembly clauses, 
the Fourth Amendment's unreasonable searches and seizures clause, and the Sixth 
Amendment's public trial and notice of accusation clauses. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 
310 U.S. 296 (1940) (religion); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (press); DeJonge 
v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) (assembly); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (search 
and seizure); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) (public trial/notice of accusation). 
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particular right "is fundamental-whether, that is, ... [it] is 
necessary to an Anglo-American regime of ordered liberty."183 
It seems only fair and proper that such Bill of Rights 
protections would apply to any form of government-it makes 
little difference, after all, to a person whose speech has been 
officially silenced, for example, whether the silencing was 
performed by the federal or a state government. Either way, 
the person is being prevented by government from speaking-a 
seemingly clear violation of the First Amendment. Yet by the 
time Earl Warren joined the Court in 1953, only a handful of 
Bill of Rights provisions had been applied to the states.184 In 
the 18-year span from when Earl Warren became Chief Justice 
until two years after his 1969 retirement, by contrast, the 
Court incorporated an additional dozen provisions (mostly 
involving criminal procedure).1ss 
The '"Warren Court revolution' gave new configuration to 
the entire constitutional landscape,"186 fundamentally changing 
the face of criminal justice in America. After these additional Bill 
of Rights provisions had been incorporated, no longer could states 
use evidence that had been seized by the police in the course of an 
unreasonable search,187 for example, and police would now be 
required to have a lawful warrant in order to search or seize 
persons, places, or things (Fourth Amendment). 18B In addition, no 
longer could a state use a defendant's refusal to testify as 
evidence of guilt, 189 nor could a state try a person more than once 
183 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 n.14 (1968). On similar reasoning, 
in a companion case to Brown, the Warren Court "reverse-incorporated," through the 
Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal 
Protection Clause (which applies textually only to state governments) so that the Equal 
Protection Clause would apply also to the federal government. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 
u.s. 497, 500 (1954). 
184 See supra note 182 and accompanying text. 
185 Most of the incorporation cases came following Felix Frankfurter's 1962 
retirement. See infra notes 187-197 and accompanying text. Thereafter, Warren, 
Brennan, and the Court's more liberal wing (Arthur Goldberg, Abe Fortas, and Thurgood 
Marshall) were able to consolidate their positions. Scheiber, supra note 2, at 10-12. 
186 Schieber, supra note 2, at 11. 
187 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655-57 (1961). Warren viewed Mapp's 
extension of the exclusionary rule to the states as '"the only way ... [to] control 
governmental misadventure' and to assure all persons, including the innocent, of 
effective protection of their rights in criminal-justice processes in the states." Scheiber, 
supra note 2, at 13. 
188 Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964). 
Not all Warren Court decisions went against the states and police. See, e.g., Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (upholding the "reasonableness" standard (versus probable 
cause) for stop-and-frisk). 
189 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Miranda, which "was entirely 
[Warren's]" according to Justice Fortas, "was the ultimate embodiment of the Warren 
fairness approach." SCHWARTZ, supra note 72, at 589, 628. 
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for the same offense (Fifth Amendment).19o A state would now be 
required to provide a speedy trial191 (by jury192) to a criminal 
defendant, who is entitled to receive the assistance of legal 
counsel193 and the opportunity to compel the appearance of 
favorable witnesses194 and to confront adverse witnesses (Sixth 
Amendment).195 No longer could states impose excessive bail or 
cruel and unusual punishments (Eighth Amendment),196 and 
finally, the First Amendment right to petition for redress of 
grievances was applied to the states.l97 
Of course, there were many critics ofthe Warren Court's 
assertive posture in incorporating virtually all of the Bill of 
Rights' criminal procedural-requirements to apply against the 
states. Many believed the Court's actions would ultimately 
contribute to a rise in crime, to which Warren later responded: 
"Thinking persons and especially lawyers know that this is not 
the fact. They know that crime is inseparably connected with 
factors such as poverty, degradation, sordid social conditions, 
and weakening of home ties, low standards of law enforcement 
and the lack of education."19s 
More fundamentally, conservative critics lamented the 
progressive Warren Court's "assault" on state sovereignty. The 
Court was criticized for being too "judicial[ly] activ[e]"199-
turning the tables on the progressives' and liberals' criticisms 
of the conservative Lochner-era Court a half century earlier for 
its assertive posture in overturning hundreds of federal and 
state laws in promotion of its vision of economic liberty.200 
Professor Vicki Jackson suggested, however, that the 
opinions reveal that the Court was not actually insensitive to the 
states, but rather, was deeply troubled by local police actions that 
failed to adhere to basic constitutional concepts of fairness and 
190 Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 793-94 (1969) (overruling Palko v. 
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937)); SCHWARTZ, supra note 72, at 742. 
191 Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 218-19, 222-23, 226 (1967). 
192 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968). 
193 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339-40 (1963). "[F]ew people realize 
that the Gideon decision resulted directly from Warren's [initiative]," Schwartz 
reported. "[T]he Chief's new law clerks [in 1961] were instructed by one of the prior 
term's clerks, 'Keep your eyes peeled for a right to counsel case. The Chief feels 
strongly that the Constitution requires a lawyer."' SCHWARTZ, supra note 72, at 457-58. 
194 Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18-19 (1967). 
195 Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965). 
196 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962). 
197 Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963). 
198 CRAY, supra note 1, at 462 (quoting Warren). 
199 See generally PHILIP B. KURLAND, POLITICS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE 
WARREN COURT (1970) (criticizing the Warren Court's activist jurisprudence). 
200 Scheiber, supra note 2, at 19. 
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human dignity.201 Simply put, "[t]here is a less consistent sense 
that [the Warren Court believed] all rights and remedies should 
be nationalized than a sense that states were doing specific things 
quite wrongly, that needed to be fixed."202 
Paradoxically, the Warren Court decisions supposedly 
infringing on state sovereignty may have actually worked to 
strengthen it. "[B]y providing the impetus for a more 
democratically legitimate form of state government, [the 
reapportionment decisions] helped contribute to a revival of states 
as a locus of reform (and thence to the more aggressive judicially 
enforced federalism in the late twentieth and early twenty-first 
centuries)."2oa In short, the Warren Court's efforts left federalism 
healthier than before, affording many more people the 
opportunity to participate in all aspects of the political process.204 
2. Privacy 
Beyond reading the Due Process Clause to apply most of 
the Bill of Rights to the states, the Warren Court also began 
interpreting the clause to encompass a broader range of 
.substantive rights. In 1968, in Loving v. Virginia, the Court 
struck down a state statute punishing interracial marriage. ''The 
freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital 
personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free 
men. Marriage is one of the 'basic civil rights of man,' fundamental 
to our very existence and survival,"2o5 wrote Chief Justice Warren 
for a unanimous Court. 'To deny this fundamental freedom on so 
unsupportable a basis as the racial classifications embodied in 
these statutes, classifications so directly subversive of the principle 
of equality at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment, is surely to 
deprive all the State's citizens of liberty without due process of 
law."206 Loving thus epitomizes the Warren Court's expansive 
201 Jackson, supra note 115, at 147-48 (further stating that the cases 
"suggest[] that the Court's purposes were not to displace state authority as such but to 
establish a minimum judicially enforceable floor of federal standards"). 
2o2 Id. at 141, 150 (stating, "It would be well to remember[, for example,] the 
record of infringement of the Fourth Amendment that confronted the Court in Mapp 
and its predecessors"). 
2oa Id. at 139. 
20• Id. at 140. 
2os Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 
316 u.s. 535, 541 (1942)). 
2oa Id. The Court also struck down the law on equal protection grounds: 
''There can be no question but that Virginia's miscegenation statutes rest solely upon 
distinctions drawn according to race .... There can be no doubt that restricting the 
freedom to marry solely because of racial classifications violates the central meaning of 
the Equal Protection Clause." Id. at 11-12. 
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reading of social liberty-a reading that fits nicely into the 
Rawlsian justice-as-fairness framework. 
More controversially, the Warren Court found an implicit 
"right of privacy" in the 1965 case, Griswold u. Connecticut.207 In 
Griswold, the Court struck down a Connecticut statute 
prohibiting the use and distribution of contraceptives. Writing for 
the Court, Justice Douglas explained that "specific guarantees in 
the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from 
those guarantees that help give them life and substance. Various 
guarantees create zones of privacy ... [and] penumbral rights of 
'privacy and repose."'208 In finding a privacy right in this case, the 
Court wondered: "Would we allow the police to search the sacred 
precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of 
contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy 
surrounding the marriage relationship."2o9 
Griswold has been roundly criticized by (primarily) 
conservative commentators, who argue that the Court should not 
recognize a right of privacy since the Constitution does not 
expressly recognize such a right. Justice Goldberg's concurring 
opinion Gained by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Brennan) 
thoroughly negates such objections, however, by highlighting the 
Ninth Amendment's dictate that, "[t]he enumeration in the 
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or 
disparage others retained by the people."210 Justices Goldberg, 
Warren, and Brennan explained, ''The Ninth Amendment to the 
Constitution may be regarded by some as a recent discovery and 
may be forgotten by others, but since 1791 it has been a basic part 
of the Constitution which we are sworn to uphold." The right of 
privacy in marriage is ''basic and fundamental and so deep-rooted 
in our society," that for any person to suggest that it is not, just 
because the Bill of Rights does not expressly state the same, "is to 
Ignore the Ninth Amendment and to give it no effect 
201 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965). 
2os Id. at 484·85 (citations omitted). The Court identified a number of such 
protections, such as the zone of privacy right of association (found in penumbra of First 
Amendment), the zone of privacy not to have soldiers quartered in one's home (Third 
Amendment), the zone of privacy to be protected against unreasonable searches and 
seizures (Fourth Amendment), and the zone of privacy not to be required to testify 
against oneself (Fifth Amendment). !d. at 484. 
209 Id. at 485-86 (stating this is "a right of privacy older than the Bill of 
Rights--{)lder than our political parties, older than our school system"). Separate, 
concurring opinions by Justices Harlan and White took a narrower approach, 
suggesting that the privacy interest at issue was instead the sort of "liberty" protected 
by the Due Proc~s Clause because it "violates basic values 'implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty."' Id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 
U.S. 319, 325 (1937)) (further stating that "[t]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment stands ... on its own bottom"). 
210 U.S. CONST. amend. IX. 
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whatsoever."211 The concurring Justices did not stop there, 
however, instead going further to suggest that any judge failing to 
recognize the right would run afoul of the Constitution: 
Moreover, a judicial construction that this fundamental right is not 
protected ... because it is not mentioned in explicit terms by one of 
the first eight amendments or elsewhere in the Constitution would 
violate the Ninth Amendment, which specifically states that "(t]he 
enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not he 
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."212 
Regrettably, even half a century later, the Supreme 
Court today fails to assertively enforce the understanding that 
the Ninth Amendment creates an expansive definition of liberty 
and equal justice-the sort of definition, incidentally, that would 
comport well with John Rawls's justice-as-fairness theory.213 The 
Goldberg/Warren/Brennan Griswold concurrence remains the 
Supreme Court's most detailed acknowledgement of the Ninth 
Amendment's robust mandate. 
That said, the various opinions in Griswold laid the 
groundwork for the Court's subsequent broader recognition of 
the Due Process Clause's role in protecting fundamental-and 
other constitutionally protected-rights, such as a woman's 
right to choose abortion,214 the right to be free of unwanted 
medical treatment, 215 the right to engage in private sexual 
activity of one's choice,216 and most recently, the right of same-
sex couples to marry.217 
E. Constitutional Bases: First Amendment 
Some suggest that the Warren Court was not as stalwart 
on matters involving the First Amendment's protection of speech, 
association, and religion. First Amendment scholar William Van 
211 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 491 (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
212 Id. at 491-92 (Goldberg, J., ·concurring) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IX) 
(further explaining that the Ninth Amendment "is almost entirely the work of James 
Madison. It was introduced in Congress by him and passed [easily by] the House and 
Senate .... These statements of Madison and [Justice Joseph] Story make clear that 
the Framers did not intend that the first eight amendments be construed to exhaust 
the basic and fundamental rights which the Constitution guaranteed to the people"). 
213 See generally Randy E. Barnett, The Ninth Amendment: It Means What It 
Says, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2006) (stating the Ninth Amendment's requirement that "the 
unenumerated (natural) rights that people possessed prior to the formation of 
government, and which they retain afterwards, should be treated in the same manner 
as those (natural) rights that were enumerated in the Bill of Rights"). 
2 14 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) 
(upholding Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)). 
21s Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
21s Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
217 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
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Alstyne suggests that the Court took too long in asserting the 
judiciary's role in curbing congressional overreach (and 
corresponding infringement of speech and association rights) in 
matters involving the national interest, for example.218 Too often 
in its early years, the Warren Court resorted to narrow 
procedural or statutory interpretations to avoid reaching First 
Amendment issues in cases involving communists and other 
alleged subversives.219 
In Walker u. Birmingham, for example, the Court affirmed 
the Reverend Martin Luther King Jr.'s and other civil rights 
activists' criminal contempt convictions for defying an Alabama 
state court order not to march.22o Reasoning that "respect for 
judicial process is a small price to pay for the civilizing hand of 
law, which alone can give abiding meaning to constitutional 
freedom," the Court said the activists should have sought instead 
to have the injunction set aside by a higher court.221 
Chief Justice Warren, Justice Brennan, and Justice Fortas 
dissented, with Warren asserting, "I do not believe that giving 
this Court's seal of approval to such a gross misuse of the judicial 
process is likely to lead to greater respect for the law."222 Warren 
believed the law was unconstitutional on its face because it lacked 
any sort of standards and worried that jailing Reverend King for 
engaging in protected speech would cause people to lose faith in 
the fairness of the judicial process.223 
Despite its reticence on some First Amendment issues, the 
Warren Court did eventually seriously consider matters of 
fairness and equity in handing down a number of key First 
Amendment opinions. Against the backdrop of McCarthy-era 
witch hunts, for example, the Court decided a series of freedom of 
association cases and reversed the convictions of (real or imagined) 
communists and their sympathizers.224 Critics, including FBI 
Director J. Edgar Hoover, began referring to the day when the 
Court issued four of these cases, June 17,1957, as ''Red 
Monday."225 In one of those cases, Yates u. United States, 226 the 
218 Scheiber, supra note 2, at 13-14 (paraphrasing William Van Alstyne). 
219 Jd. 
220 Walker v. Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967). 
22 1 Id. at 307, 309, 311-12, 321. 
222 Id. at 330 (Warren, C.J., dissenting). 
223 SCHWARTZ, supra note 72, at 632·33. 
224 
"The law clerks starting kidding each other about the fact that we had the 
Communists before us in at least a dozen or more cases and they were winning every 
one," recalled a Warren law clerk about the end of the 1956 Term. I d. at 280. 
22s CRAY, supra note 1, at 332-38. 
226 Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957). The other three cases handed 
down "the same day were Watkins u. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957) (reversing 
conviction of a labor leader for declining to discuss his associations and beliefs and 
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Court reversed the convictions of individuals who had been 
charged, essentially because of their membership in the 
Communist Party, with conspiracy to overthrow the U.S. 
government by force. Writing for the majority, Justice Harlan 
said the district court had not properly differentiated between 
advocacy for an abstract idea and advocacy for action to bring 
about the idea.227 "The essential distinction," he said, "is that 
those to whom the advocacy is addressed must be urged to do 
something, now or in the future, rather than merely to believe in 
something."228 By drawing a hard line between advocacy 
(protected) and action (not protected), the Supreme Court 
precipitated the end of Congress's McCarthy-era witch hunts.229 
The landmark case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan230 
was a bulwark for freedom of speech and of the press.231 In 
Sullivan, the Warren Court struck down an Alabama state court 
award of $500,000 in damages to a plaintiff city commissioner 
who claimed defamation due to certain trivial factual inaccuracies 
in an adve,rtisement placed in the New York Times by civil rights 
activists.232 Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Brennan 
explained that the Constitution prevents a public official from 
recovering damages for defamation unless he or she "proves that 
the statement was made with 'actual malice'-that is, with 
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether 
it was false or not."233 The Court reasoned that "erroneous 
statement is inevitable in free debate, and ... must be protected if 
the freedoms of expression are to have the 'breathing space' that 
they 'need ... to survive."'234 The Warren Court thus created a 
framework for protecting the ability of anyone-individuals, 
groups, and the press alike-to criticize the government or other 
public figures without fear of legal repercussions. 
placing limits on House Un-American Activities Committee), Sweezy v. New 
Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957) (holding state investigation into alleged subversive 
activities violates Due Process Clause), and Service u. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957) 
(finding invalid the discharge of diplomat who had been released for disloyalty in 
violation of the State Department's own procedures). 
221 Yates, 354 U.S. at 320. 
22s Id. at 324-25. 
229 See, e.g., SAMUEL WALKER, PRESIDENTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES FROM WILSON 
TO 0BAMA: A STORY OF POOR CUSTODIANS 196-97 (2012). 
230 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
231 Id. at 256. 
232 Id. at 256-59, 264. 
233 Id. at 279-80. 
234 ld. at 271-73 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)) (further 
stating, "Criticism of ... [government officials') official conduct does not lose its 
constitutional protection merely because it is effective criticism and hence diminishes 
their official reputations'). 
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In the same vein, the Warren Court's sympathetic position 
regarding the antiwar protests of the 1960s largely mirrored the 
views of the Chief Justice (who himself observed that "[t]his is a 
country that was born in protest"), who suggested that the 
protests "may prove effective in shaking the Establishment out of 
complacency and smugness."235 In Tinker u. Des Moines 
Independent Community School District,236 for example, the Court 
held that the act of students wearing black armbands to protest 
the Vietnam War was the sort of expressive conduct-similar to 
"pure speech"-protected by the First Amendment.237 
Finally, the Warren Court established the highly speech-
protective "clear and present danger" standard for incitement of 
illegal activity, a standard that survives to this day. In 
Brandenburg u. Ohio,238 the Court reversed the convictions of Ku 
Klux Klan members who had burned a cross and chanted racist 
threats and epithets at a meeting held on a farm outside 
Cincinnati, reasoning that under the constitutional grants of 
freedom of speech and of the press, a state cannot prevent 
advocacy for the use of force unless that advocacy was used or was 
likely to incite "imminent lawless action."239 The Warren Court 
thus "completed the Court's long journey toward the embrace of 
radical speech" and "declared that speech triumphed over fear."24o 
On matters of First Amendment religious freedom, the 
Warren Court was both bold and highly controversial. In a school 
prayer case, Engel u. Vitale, 241 for example, the Court found short 
opening prayers in public schools to be unconstitutional 
abridgements of the Establishment Clause. Writing for the Court, 
Justice Black reasoned that 
235 CRAY, supra note 1, at 487 (quoting Warren, who added, "[Protest is] a way 
people have of bringing about progress"). Warren "seemed to understand the protest 
movement," recalled Warren's law clerk, Paul Meyer. Id. Meyer added, "[f]or a man of 
his age, my expectation would have been that Warren would be more narrow-minded 
than he was, more fixed in a lot of positions than he was." I d. 
236 Tinker v. Des Moines lndep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
237 Id. at 505-06; see also United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 375-77, 382 
(1968) (determining that the conduct of burning a draft card in opposition to the Vietnam 
War was sufficiently expressive in nature to merit a measure of protection under the First 
Amendment and fmding, on the facts, that the government met its burden, and thus 
upholding O'Brien's conviction for burning his draft card in violation of federal law). 
238 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
239 I d. at 447-48 (explaining that "the mere abstract teaching ... of the moral 
propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to force and violence, is not the same as 
preparing a group for violent action and steeling it to such action" (quoting Noto v. 
United States, 367 U.S. 290, 297-98 (1961))). 
240 NEWTON, supra note 64, at 504; Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 
(1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
241 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
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the constitutional prohibition· against laws respecting an establishment 
of religion must at least mean that in this country it is no part of the 
business of government to compose official prayers for any group of the 
American people to recite as a part of a religious program carried on 
by government.242 
715 
Across the country, reaction to the holding was intense, 
prompting the largest volume of critical mail to the Court in its 
history. Warren himself recalled, "I vividly remember one bold 
newspaper headline, 'Court Outlaws God."'243 Condemning the 
Court, unhappy religious leaders communicated their "shock and 
regret."244 Indeed, the Warren Court's position in Engle v. Vitale 
even turned the popular minister Billy Graham off to the Court.24 5 
Finally, in United States v. Seeger, 246 a Vietnam War-era 
case, the Warren Court broadly interpreted the First 
Amendment's protection of free exercise of religion to allow a 
religiously agnostic person to claim statutory conscientious 
objector status and thus avoid the military draft. The Court 
explained, "[A]ny person opposed to war on the basis of a sincere 
belief, which in his life fills the same place as a belief in God fills 
in the life of an orthodox religionist, is entitled to exemption 
under the statute."247 Chief Justice Warren joined the majority, 
commenting at conference, "Seeger believed 'in a guiding spirit 
and that's enough to give [him] the exemption. I don't know how 
to define "Supreme Being'' and judges perhaps ought not do so."'24s 
This nonjudgmental cognizance of individ.ual autonomy and 
diversity of views-religious and nonreligious alike--epitomizes 
the approach encouraged by John Rawls's original position-of-
equality formulation and sets a standard for judicial respect to 
which all judges and courts should aspire. 
The Warren Court's fairness jurisprudence, grounded 
primarily in the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection and 
Due Process Clauses, had a profoundly positive impact on 
American life. The next part briefly discusses that legacy before 
concluding that the Warren Court's justice-as-fairness 
jurisprudence, as augmented by John Rawls's theory of justice, 
would serve as a useful template for judicial decisionmaking in 
the twenty-first century. 
242 !d. at 425. 
243 SCHWARTZ, supra note 72, at 441 (quoting Warren). 
244 ld. 
245 Jd. 
246 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965). 
247 /d. at 192-93 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
248 SCHWARTZ, supra note 72, at 570. 
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III. THE WARREN COURT'S LEGACY: RAWLSIAN JUSTICE-AS-
FAIRNESS AS JUDICIAL GUIDING PRINCIPLE 
The Warren Court's legacy is imposing. Although the 
Court was hugely controversial in its day, its "great moral 
teaching," Brown v. Board of Education, "remains the ideal; the 
United States shall not be two societies, separate and unequal,"249 
reflects Warren biographer Ed Cray. The benefits to redistricting 
accomplished by the reapportionment cases persist, and despite 
its widely contested beginnings, the concept of "one person, one 
vote" has become firmly implanted in the public consciousness as 
a core feature of basic fairness in the political system.25o In 
criminal law, basic rights against self-incrimination and 
unreasonable search and seizure, as well as rights to legal 
representation, were finally given full force-against state and 
local governments as well as against the federal government-
during the Warren Court years.zs1 
These axioms, in addition to the decisions that quelled the 
McCarthy-era communist witch hunts and gave meaning to the 
First Amendment's separation of church and state by forbidding 
prayer in public schools, have become integral threads in the 
American legal fabric. The enduring breadth and scope of the 
Warren Court's decisions is striking.zsz Indeed, with its embrace, 
both expressly and implicitly, of basic concepts of human rights 
and public virtue, the Court made impressive progress in 
pursuing the ideals of fairness and equal ju~tice.253 These Warren 
Court concepts, as further informed by John Rawls's "justice-as-
fairness" formulations, can provide useful tools for judicial 
decisionmaking in the twenty-first century. 
A. Opposition and Support 
The Warren Court was nothing if not polarizing. On one 
hand, its supporters and adherents sang the Court's praises for 
addressing long-neglected principles of fairness and equal justice. 
Meanwhile, its opponents were unrelenting in their criticism, 
thinking the Court "too doctrinaire, too eager to right what it 
takes to be wrong, too much concerned with grand abstractions of 
liberty at the expense of the orderly growth and continuity of the 
249 CRAY, supra note 1, at 530. 
250 ld. 
251 Id. 
252 NEWTON, supra note 64, at 517. 
253 Scheiber, supra note 2, at 21. 
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law."254 Whether "enlightened" or "unprincipled," the Warren 
Court engendered passionate opinions on both sides. 
1. Opposition 
Any account of the Warren Court would be incomplete 
without mentioning the wrath it engendered among its critics. 
The heavy criticism began in the Warren Court's :very first year 
with its decision in Brown v. Board of Education and continued 
with varying levels of intensity throughout the next 16 years.2s5 
Professor Gary McDowell said, for example, "Since Brown, the 
Court has continued to expand, and to confuse the public 
perception of, its power of equity. The result has been to 
substitute social-science speculation for precedent and principle 
as the standard of both constitutional meaning and equitable 
relief."2s6 Brown was only the beginning, however. 
As the Court in the mid-1950s began undoing the 
McCarthy era's damaging excesses by reversing trumped-up 
convictions of communists and their alleged sympathizers 
(culminating with Red Monday on June 17, 1957),257 opponents' 
denunciations intensified. The widely circulated book, Nine Men 
Against America: The Supreme· Court and Its Assault on 
American Liberties,258 for example, asserted that on Red 
Monday, "[t]he Court really went to town-amid the cheers and 
hurrahs of the communist conspirators."2ss 
254 CRAY, supra note 1, at 436 (quoting Newsweek). 
255 Perhaps it was inevitable that the Warren Court triggered fierce opposition 
for its progressive approach. Throughout the millennia, institutions and individuals 
who have upset the well-settled, entrenched, too-often-unfair practices of the ruling 
classes have encountered intense resistance. Witness, for example, the hardships 
encountered by the brave individuals who have led the way throughout 400 years of 
American history in agitating against the discriminatory and unfair practices of the 
particular day's status quo. See MICHAEL ANTHONY LAWRENCE, RADICALS IN THEIR 
OWN TIME: FOUR HUNDRED YEARS OF STRUGGLE FOR LIBERTY AND EQUAL JUSTICE IN 
AMERICA (2011) (discussing the contributions of Roger Williams (d.1683), who 
advocated for religious liberty of conscience; Thomas Paine (d.1809), who promoted 
political and individual rights; Elizabeth Cady Stanton (d.1902), who agitated for 
women's rights; W.E.B. Du Bois (d.1963), who argued for black rights; and Vine 
Deloria, Jr. (d.2005), who advocated for Native American rights). 
256 MCDOWELL, supra note 116, at 9. 
257 See supra notes 224-229 and accompanying text; CRA Y, supra note 1, at 336-37. 
258 ROSALIE M. GORDON, NINE MEN AGAINST AMERICA: THE SUPREME COURT 
AND ITS ATTACK ON AMERICAN LIBERTIES (1958). 
259 SCHWARTZ, supra note 72, at 250 (quoting GORDON, supra note 258, at 
128). Regarding Red Monday, the book asserted, 
"Chief Justice Warren ... took away from congressional investigating 
committees their freedom of inquiry [in Watkins]"; in Sweezy "he nailed down 
the clamp ... on the rights of the states to protect their students against 
subversive teachers"; and Yates "makes it practically impossible to prosecute 
conspirators against America." 
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Fueled by Nine Men, the first efforts to impeach Earl 
Warren began with the obscure Cinema Educational Guild in 
September 1957, and continued with such groups as the John 
Birch Society for the next decade or more.260 "Impeach Earl 
Warren" signs were ubiquitous along the nation's roads and 
highways, and members of Congress received volumes of letters 
favoring impeachment. Flyers urging impeachment were even 
seen at Earl Warren High School in Downey, California, and 
during these years, Warren was frequently accosted at public 
functions by shouting protestors who would sometimes throw 
their "Impeach Earl Warren" signs at him.261 The Georgia state 
legislature got into the act, too, voting to impeach Warren and the 
other Justices for committing ''high crimes and misdemeanors."262 
It was not only anticommunists and segregationists who 
were opposed to the progressive Warren Court; business groups 
like the National Association of Manufacturers and the National 
Chamber of Commerce were also critical of the Court's perceived 
"antibusiness" posture on antitrust and labor issues.263 Congress 
debated the Jenner-Butler bill (thwarted eventually by efforts led 
by Senate majority leader Lyndon B. Johnson), which would have 
removed the Court's appellate jurisdiction in security cases.264 
Even President Eisenhower, who had earlier opposed the school 
desegregation decisions,265 jumped in, reportedly proclaiming that 
his appointment of Earl Warren as Chief Justice "was the biggest 
damn fool thing I ever did."z66 
ld. (quoting GORDON, supra note 258, at 128·30). 
260 CRAY, supra note 1, at 389·91; SCHWARTZ, supra note 72, at 250. 
261 SCHWARTZ, supra note 72, at 281·82, 627. For his part, Warren himself 
maintained a sense of humor. "Just below his framed commission as Chief 
Justice ... on his library wall, there hung the 1965 New Yorker cartoon showing an 
indignant caricature of Whistler's Mother frantically embroidering a sampler, 'IMPEACH 
EARL WARREN,"' reports Schwartz. "According to one of his sons, 'It really breaks him 
up.' Warren himself laughingly told a Southern law clerk that, if he was fired by the 
Chief, he could go back home and run for Governor unopposed on both parties' tickets." 
Id. at 281-82 (footnote omitted). 
262 ld. at 250. 
263 CRAY, supra note 1, at 322. 
264 SCHWARTZ, supra note 72, at 280; NEWTON, supra note 64, at 365-66. 
265 • CRAY, supra note 1, at 337. "Eisenhower ... regarded racial segregation as 
being so ingrained in social mores and long accepted in the law that the Court ought 
not to 'meddle' with it." Scheiber, supra note 2, at 5. Warren and the rest of the 
Justices resented Eisenhower's lack of support. William Douglas, for example, placed 
blame for the South's resistance to Brown squarely at the President's feet, commenting 
in his autobiography, "[Eisenhower's] ominous silence on our 1954 decision gave 
courage to the racists who decided to resist the decision ward by ward, precinct by 
precinct, town by town, and county by county." SCHWARTZ, supra note 72, at 175 
(quoting William Douglas). 
266 CRAY, supra note 1, at 337. Despite the President's alleged disdain, during the 
Red Monday furor he "called on the nation to respect the Supreme Court, which he termed 
'one of the great stabilizing influences of this country."' SCHWARTZ, supra note 72, at 250. 
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By the early 1960s, 32 state legislatures had approved 
resolutions for a constitutional convention to discuss, among 
other things, the Warren Court's apportionment decisions.2s1 
Erwin Griswold, Harvard Law School dean, weighed in, 
stating, "The Supreme Court is as good a way as man has ever 
invented to resolve judicial problems-but I very much doubt 
that it's a good way to resolve political problems."26B 
In 1964, Republican presidential nominee Senator 
Barry Goldwater accused the Warren Court of being the least 
faithful among the three branches of government to the 
principle of limited government and charged the Court with 
jeopardizing social order "just to give criminals a sporting 
chance to go free." 269 Stating that he would scrap the Court's 
criminal law decisions if elected, Goldwater further pledged to 
nominate to the Supreme Court only "seasoned men who will 
support the Constitution."21o 
Specific criticism of the Warren Court's approach to state-
federal relations long abounded. In a 1958 report, the unofficial 
Conference of State Chief Justices criticized the Warren Court for 
systematically moving power to the federal government from the 
states and for improperly making policy with its decisions.271 The 
Warren Court's incorporation decisions of the 1960s just added 
fuel to the fire, to the point where there was a serious possibility 
for passage of a proposal, supported by many state legislatures, to 
gather the 50 state chief justices into a so-called Court of the 
Union. This new Court would be tasked with the authority to 
reverse Supreme Court decisions-a prospect that Earl Warren 
found particularly threatening.272 As we shall see, however, many 
did not share such negative opinions of the Warren Court. 
267 CRAY, supra note 1, at 436. Thirty·four states would be the minimum 
required to call a convention. U.S. CONST. art. V. 
268 CRAY, supra note 1, at 436. The U.S. News & World Report observed 
critically after Earl Warren's lO·year Supreme Court anniversary that "the trend of the 
Warren Court in using its judicial authority to promote change in more and more fields 
shows no sign of abating." ld. at 410 (quoting U.S. News & World Report). Congress 
expressed its disapproval after the 1963 Term by limiting the Supreme Court Justices' 
pay raise to $4,500 even while providing a full $7,500 for other federal judges. 
SCHWARTZ, supra note 72, at 542. 
269 SCHWARTZ, supra note 72, at 542 (quoting Sen. Goldwater). 
210 Id. (quoting Sen. Goldwater). 
271 CRAY, supra note 1, at 352. The vote count among the state supreme court 
chief justices was 36-8 in favor of adopting the critical report. I d. 
212 CRAY, supra note 1, at 391. 
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2. Support 
Even while the Warren Court endured much criticism, it 
was also the object of copious high praise. Characterizing June 
15, 1964, when the Court handed down Reynolds v. Sims 
(mandating that all voting districts must be apportioned on the 
basis of "one person, one vote"),273 as "one of the great days in 
the Supreme Court's history," for example, the esteemed New 
York Times reporter Anthony Lewis asked rhetorically, "Where 
would we be today if the Supreme Court had not been willing 
ten years ago to tackle the great moral issue of racial 
discrimination that Congress had so long avoided?"274 
For its part, around the same time, the Washington Post 
editorialized, "[N]ot since the formative days of the Republic 
when John Marshall presided over its deliberation has the 
Supreme Court played so dynamic a part in American affairs 
as during the dozen years since Earl Warren became Chief 
Justice of the United States [Supreme Court]."275 Recalling the 
period shortly after Warren's retirement, journalist Jim 
Newton stated, "[T]he early 1970s were full of reminders of 
Warren's esteem, as the Warren Court pivoted from its place as 
object of controversy to one of lionization and nostalgia."z1s It is 
no exaggeration to say that among its more ardent admirers, 
the Warren Court was a savior of sorts for the Constitution's 
concept of equal justice under the law. 
The Warren Court's influence spread abroad, as well. In 
other countries, among the most admired aspects of the Court's 
jurisprudence was its commitment to criminal defendants' due 
process rights.277 Reformers in Latin America, Canada, and 
elsewhere looked to the Warren Court as an inspirational judicial 
exemplar and agent for political and social change. In particular, 
the Court promoted the notion that judges could take principled 
stands against the executive and legislative branches of 
government in furtherance of protecting the less advantaged.278 
Earl Warren himself, as the face of the Supreme Court 
that through a decade and a half of progressive jurisprudence 
created a more fair, just, and humane America, received many 
273 See supra notes 161-171 and accompanying text. 
274 SCHWARTZ, supra note 72, at 507 (quoting Anthony Lewis). 
275 CRAY, supra note 1, at 478. 
276 NEWTON, supra note 64, at 510. 
277 Scheiber, supra note 2, at 22-23 (stating that "[a) line of provisions in the 
1987 Korean constitution and subsequent decisions of its constitutional court read like 
a catalogue of the major reforms that the Warren Court imposed on America's law of 
criminal procedure"). 
278 ld. at 22-24. 
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personal plaudits as welL The St. Louis Post-Dispatch reported 
in 1966, for example, that "[m]ore and more, Justice Warren is 
being hailed as one of the great Chief Justices in history, a 
towering figure ranking with John Marshall and Charles Evan 
Hughes." The New York Times Magazine labeled him "the 
greatest Chief Justice in the nation's history," period.279 
Internationally, from the time he delivered the Court's 
unanimous opinion in Brown v. Board of Education in 1954, 
Warren was virtually lionized. "Within an hour of the [Brown] 
decision, the Voice of America broadcast announced the opinion," 
wrote Cray. "Before nightfall, reports of Brown in thirty-four 
languages proclaimed the ruling a victory in the diplomatic war 
between East and West for the allegiance of unaligned nations."2so 
The San Francisco Chronicle opined, "[t]o the vast majority of the 
peoples of the world who have colored skins, it will come as a 
blinding flash of light and hope."281 "[Warren] has emerged," 
observed Washington Post columnist John P. Mackenzie, "as a 
world figure and symbol of an American commitment to equal 
justice to all races and income levels."2s2 The Conferences on 
World Peace Through the Law, upon awarding Warren its first 
Human Rights Award in 1973, commented, "When history 
reviews the record of our day in terms of man, leadership and 
their accomplishment in advancing human rights, no name will 
loom larger than that of Earl Warren."2s3 Solicitor General J. Lee 
Rankin recalled, ''When you travel ... , you realize [Warren] is 
the best-known American in the world. The new nations of Asia 
and Africa call him a saint-the greatest humanitarian in the 
Western Hemisphere since Abraham Lincoln," and jurists 
worldwide prominently placed on their office walls'photographs of 
themselves with Chief Justice Warren.2s4 
B. Human Rights and Public Virtue 
A palpable subtext running through the Warren Court's 
jurisprudence (also clearly apparent in John Rawls's justice-as-
279 CRAY, supra note 1, at 478; see also NEWTON, supra note 64, at 510 
(stating, "Warren himself was regularly included in any short list of great justices, 
sometimes joined only by Marshall and Charles Evan Hughes when ranked against 
history's other chief justices"). 
2so CRAY, supra note 1, at 292. 
281 Id. (quoting the San Francisco Chronicle and further stating, "Brown 
unexpectedly raised the man who made that possible into a world figure"). 
282 !d. at 4 79. 
283 Id. at 515. At the same conference two years earlier, Warren was 
recognized "for his landmark decisions upholding human rights which have justly 
earned him worldwide esteem as a champion of the liberty of man." Id. 
284 Id. at 293. 
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fairness theory) was its recognition of basic human rights and its 
acknowledgment of the importance of public virtue in civil society. 
1. Human Rights 
Concern for human rights and dignity had increased in 
the years following the atrocities of World War II, and the Warren 
Court reflected this heightened global awareness.285 The Court's 
incorporation cases286 "rais[ed] the floor of basic constitutional 
norms designed to protect individuals from unfair treatment by 
any government, state or federal [actor], ... [and] can be seen as 
harbingers of what has become a more generalized human rights 
consciousness among jurists around the world."2s7 
Brown u. Board of Education in 1954 was the first Warren 
Court case to suggest that human dignity was a constitutional 
principle, holding that official school segregation was 
unconstitutional because it caused among blacks "a feeling of 
inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their 
hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever ·to be undone."288 This 
constitutional principle was then further emphasized in the civil 
rights movement of the 1960s, when both the legislative and 
executive branches extended their commitment to Brown's 
principles through the promotion and passage of legislation such as 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965.289 
As .noted, Chief Justice Warren was willing to move the 
Court in unprecedentedly assertive ways to impose upon the 
states the human rights principles contained first in the 
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause (Brown)290 and 
later the Bill of Rights (the incorporation cases).291 In principle, 
Warren understood the Constitution's commitment to a federalist 
system where the national and state governments share power. He 
did not, however, believe that federalism as a concept was so static 
as to require the same sort of state-national balance that existed at 
the time of the framing, the Reconstruction amendments, or any 
285 Jackson, supra note 115, at 139. 
286 See supra notes 173-204 and accompanying text. 
287 Jackson, supra note 115, at 138-39. This consciousness is reflected "in 
international documents and in the new constitutions adopted in other federal systems 
such as Germany, India, and, later on, Canada." Id. at 138 (footnotes omitted); see also 
Scheiber, supra note 2, at 10-12 (discussing the Warren Court's role in applying, 
through the process of "incorporation," many Bill of Rights provisions to the states). 
288 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 34 7 U.S. 483, 494 (1954). 
289 See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Dignity is a Constitutional Principle, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 29, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/30/opinionfsunday/dignity-is-a-
constitutional-principle.html [http://perma.cc/L T9N-D3JF]. 
290 See supra notes 132-148 and accompanying text. 
291 See supra notes 173-204 and accompanying text. 
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other time in the past.292 Indeed, the Warren Court believed deeply 
in the U.S. Constitution as an optimistic instrument for advancing 
equal justice and recognizing human rights in the context of a 
more modern, globally interconnected world.293 
2. Public Virtue 
Another characteristic of the Warren Court was its 
implicit recognition of the importance of encouraging a sense of 
"public virtue," or common good, in society. This principle, time 
honored from the nation's founding, is epitomized by Earl 
Warren's 1953 comment as he moved from California governor 
to the U.S. Supreme Court: "I am glad to be going to the 
Supreme Court because now I can help the less fortunate, the 
people in our society who suffer, the disadvantaged."294 
Time and again, the Court that bore Warren's name 
practiced this sort of principled, public-minded altruism, 
employing principles that would later become associated with 
John Rawls's "justice-as-fairness" approach (based on providing 
fairly for even the least-advantaged members of society). Rawls's 
"original position may derive from rules that stress rationality 
and self-interest,"295 Professor Bruce Antkowiak explained, "but 
the veil of ignorance changes societal decision-making from an 
exercise in selfishness to one of public-mindedness .... When the 
veil [is lifted], a sense of shared, common good emerges that 
society affirms publicly. In affirming this common good, the 
society becomes 'well-ordered."'296 This concept would be very 
familiar to America's founding generation, which had deeply held 
ideas of public virtue-or "Public Spirit"-and what constituted 
virtuous conduct. "Virtue was the common bond that tied together 
the Greek, Roman, Christian, British, and European ideas of 
government and politics to which the founders responded."297 
292 Scheiber, supra note 2, at 18. 
29:! Jackson, supra note 115, at 186-87 (stating, "Sensitivity to international 
democratic norms was a marked feature in the Warren Court's jurisprudence," and 
noting "[t]he Warren Court's references to the Universal Declaration [of Human 
Rights] and to other aspects of the nascent structure of international human rights"). 
The modern Supreme Court, by contrast, has been much more insular. !d. (stating, 
"[W]e see the emergence of an aggressive strand of hostility expressed, notably by 
Justice Scalia, to the idea that U.S. constitutional decision making would benefit from 
considering the legal views or experiences of other countries or international bodies"). 
294 CRAY, supra note 1, at 255. 
295 Antkowiak, supra note 43, at 601. 
"
96 !d. (footnotes omitted). 
297 Richard Vetterli and Gary Bryner, Public Virtue and the Roots of American 
Government, 27 BYU STUD. 29, 29 (1987) ("The idea of virtue was central to the 
political thought of the founders of the American republic. Every body of thought they 
encountered, every intellectual tradition they consulted, every major theory of 
724 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81:2 
Leaders of the day understood virtue as the very foundation upon 
which republican government is built and recognized it as a key 
factor in advancing the common good.zss 
Thomas Paine, America's revolutionary polemicist and 
best-selling eighteenth-century author, insisted that acting in 
the public good was not to act against the good of individuals. 
Rather, by acting for the good of everyone, each individual was 
served.299 Paine also commented: 
When it shall be said in any country ... my poor are happy; neither 
ignorance nor distress is to be found among them; my jails are empty 
of prisoners, my streets of beggars; the aged are not in want; the taxes 
are not oppressive ... ; when these things can be said, then may that 
country boast its constitution and its government.3oo 
Paine believed that virtuous nations have special responsibilities 
for the well-being of the weak, poor, and vulnerable. He 
advocated, therefore, for such policies as progressive taxation, aid 
to the unemployed, and free public education.3oi 
Throughout the following two centuries, as articulated by 
many prominent progressive thinkers, the ideas of public virtue 
and common good made a large sweep of the American social and 
political landscapes. Though battered in the uber-capitalist frenzy 
of recent decades, ideas extolling the common good do still exist 
today. As one of the foremost moral authorities of recent times, 
Pope John Paul II, put it, human beings should seek to pursue the 
common good-"[the] good of all and of each individual, because 
we are really responsible for all."302 Not surprisingly, the ideas of 
public virtue and common good go hand-in-hand with the Golden 
Rule, an idea that has long been practiced in one form or another 
by all of the world's major religions.3o3 
Earl Warren believed in these principles. A few years 
after leaving the Court, he commented in a New York Times 
opinion editorial that social welfare programs are "not an evil 
word" when hunger affects millions of Americans.3o4 "When 
republican government by which they were influenced emphasized the importance of 
personal and public virtue."). 
298 ld. at 46. 
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hundreds of millions of dollars are given to bankrupt railroads, 
failing defense manufacturers, shipping interests and the like, 
the words 'welfare' or 'relief' are not used," he noted ironically. 
"Instead s;uch things are done to 'strengthen the economy."'aos 
Fortunately, traditional ideals of public virtue and concern 
for the _common good have not disappeared entirely from twenty-
first-century public discourse. As President Barack Obama stated 
in his second inaugural address on January 20, 2013, 
[P]reserving our individual freedoms ultimately requires collective 
action .... For we, the people, understand that our country cannot 
succeed when a shrinking few do very well and a growing many 
barely make it .... We, the people, still believe that every citizen 
deserves a basic measure of security and dignity.306 
The president essentially invoked the veil-of-ignorance 
paradigm in recognizing "that no matter how responsibly we live 
our lives, any one of us at any time may face a job loss, or a 
sudden illness, or a home swept away in a terrible storm." 
Obama insisted that "[t]he commitments we make to each other 
through Medicare and Medicaid and Social Security, these 
things do not sap our initiative, they strengthen us. They do not 
make us a nation of takers; they free us to take the risks that 
make this country great."3o7 
Responding to Obama's Rawlsian remarks,308 conservative-
leaning New York Times columnist David Brooks commented that 
"[Obama's] critique was implicit. There has been too much 'me'-
too much individualism and narcissism, too much retreating into 
the private sphere. There hasn't been enough 'us,' not enough 
communal action for the common good."so9 And Washington Post 
columnist Michael Gerson suggested that "American politics 
would be elevated by a renewed commitment to the common 
good, ... [making it] more civil, admirable and humane."a10 By 
honoring basic concepts of human rights and public virtue, the 
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Warren Court epitomized how a modern governmental institution 
can advance the worthy ideals of fairness and equal justice. 
CONCLUSION 
It would be useful, in order to create a more fair, just, and 
humane America, to look to Rawlsian justice-as-fairness theory 
for guidance in judicial decisionmaking. In light of common law 
imperatives of stare decisis, an acceptable way for judges to 
proceed would be to adopt as a normative ideal the (essentially 
Rawlsian) equity-based fairness jurisprudence approach employed 
so effectively by the Warren Court in the years 1953-1969. 
John Rawls reasoned that the justice-as-fairness 
principles may serve, at the very least, "as a guiding framework, 
which if jurists find it convincing, may orient their reflections, 
complement their knowledge, and assist their judgment."311 And it 
is proper for judges to look to political philosophy for guidance. 
Judges should not consider political philosophy as irrelevant, 
since they often behave as de facto political philosophers when 
interpreting the Constitution and imparting constitutional values. 
"Avoiding political philosophy means doing bad philosophy, not 
doing without it."312 And among existing political philosophies 
dealing with "justice" as a concept, Rawls's theory is vastly 
superior to any other.313 
Justice-as-fairness decision making, as based primarily in 
the properly expansive Equal Protection and Due Process 
Clauses, is neither inappropriate nor arbitrary. Indeed, its 
approach of reasoning from behind a veil of ignorance is probably 
more objective than many decisions claiming to be based on the 
often uncertain or ambiguous "original intent" of long-deceased 
ancestors. The noted historian Joseph Ellis reports that the 
original intent doctrine "has always struck most historians of the 
founding era as rather bizarre."314 For, as historians, they 
understand how much deep disagreement there was at the 
Constitutional Convention and at the state ratifying conventions 
about the Constitution's basic provisions. Original intent doctrine 
"requires you to believe that the 'miracle at Philadelphia' was a 
uniquely omniscient occasion when 55 mere mortals were 
permitted a glimpse of the eternal verities and then embalmed 
311 Rawls, supra note 44, at 84. 
312 Griffin, supra note 14, at 779. 
313 Id. at 779-82. 
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their insights in the document. Any professional historian 
proposing such an interpretation today would be laughed off the 
stage." Ellis concluded, "That four sitting justices on the Supreme 
Court-Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, John Roberts and 
Samuel Alito-daim to believe in it, or some version of it, is truly 
strange."315 And yet original intent reasoning continues to 
dominate constitutional discourse. 
To illustrate how a judge might perform a Rawlsian 
justice-as-fairness analysis, consider a court's determination of 
probable cause for issuing a warrant to search the home of a 
person suspected of (and later charged with) committing a crime, 
such as a home robbery. Such a determination involves the 
interests of three parties-the defendant, the victim, and society. 
From behind the veil of ignorance, the judge places herself in the 
position of each of the three parties arguing separately for just 
consideration. From the perspective of the defendant, the invasion 
of privacy is at least upsetting-and even shocking if the 
defendant is truly innocent. The victim, for her part, would want 
the police not to be unnecessarily hampered as they search for 
evidence of the robbery. Finally, society wants to know that the 
neighborhood is safe from criminals but is also concerned about 
overzealous policing leading to excessive intrusions on home 
privacy. Proceeding in this way, the judge would then ask 
whether "a rational, self-interested person adjudicating this case 
[would] find the amount of evidence presented ... sufficient to 
justify ... [the search] regardless of whether they would turn out 
later to be the victim of the crime, the person searched, or the 
neighbor down the street? If yes, probable cause exists."316 
It is important to note, however, that judges will differ 
even when applying Rawlsian analysis. Judges are human beings, 
after all. Even so, the justice-as-fairness approach does provide a 
useful framework for courts seeking just outcomes.317 Ultimately, 
justice is served through such a process, which bases the probable 
cause determination on the balancing of personal and societal 
interests in a way that seeks to maximize the common good. And 
not insignificantly, judges may accordingly find that their 
opinions "weather the test of time" by applying original position 
analysis.318 
Rawls believed that "[h]istorically one of the main defects 
of constitutional government has been the failure to insure the 
315 !d. 
316 Antkowiak, supra note 43, at 598. 
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fair value of politicalliberty,"a19 or the,right to participate equally, 
fully, and meaningfully in a democratic society. "Disparities in the 
distribution of property and wealth that far exceed what is 
compatible with political equality have. generally been tolerated 
by the legal system."azo This is a major problem in America, where 
today, income inequality is higher than at any time since the 
early 1900s and where money plays such an outsized role in the 
political process.321 As Justice Louis Brandeis once warned in the 
decades following the last Gilded Age, "[w]e can have democracy 
in this country, or we can have great wealth concentrated in the 
hands of a few, but we can't have both."azz 
It should be emphasized that, according to Rawls, "full and 
meaningful participation" does not require absolutely equal 
participation. The second principle of justice permits inequalities 
in economic goods, so it follows that not every person, in practical 
terms, has the same opportunity to participate. Absolute equality 
is not"the goal; rather, the goal is to "take whatever steps we can 
to ensure that everyone has a fair chance to hold public office, to 
be informed about political issues, to place items on the public 
agenda, and generally to influence the political process."aza 
There is no doubt that Supreme Court decisions since the 
Warren Court have failed to meet a standard of "taking whatever 
steps we can to ensure that everyone has a fair chance" to 
participate meaningfully in the political process. First, money in 
politics is out of control. The wealthy enjoy a massively 
disproportionate voice and role in the political process, as enabled 
by the Court's decidedly non-Rawlsian, overly broad, and 
formalistic interpretations of the First Amendment's protection of 
free expression-first in 1976 in Buckley v. Valeo, 324 and most 
3 19 Griffin, supra note 14, at 770 (quoting JOHN. RAWLS, A THEORY OF 
JUSTICE (1971)). 
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recently in 2010 in Citizens United u. FEC.325 Rawls, who 
advocated for the independence of political parties from private 
wealth, campaign and election public financing, caps on the 
amount of contributions to political campaigns, and government 
subsidies for full discussion of public issues, was highly critical of 
Buckley for striking down campaign finance legislation.326 
Second, for millions of citizens, the fair chance for 
meaningful participation in the political process has been severely 
compromised by the Roberts Court's recent gutting of the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965 in Shelby County u. Holder,327 a case 
demonstrating a disturbing lack of concern for the corollary to the 
one person, one vote principle that states should make every 
effort to enable and encourage all eligible voters to vote. In Shelby 
County, the Court struck down the Act's formula requiring states 
and localities with a history of discrimination to receive 
preapproval from the Justice Department before making changes 
to their voting laws. (This despite the fact that the Act had been 
renewed by Congress in 2006 by a vote of 390-33 in the House 
and 98-0 in the Senate-rare agreement among Democrats and 
Republicans in a highly partisan Congress.) In short, far from 
seeking to enable and encourage all eligible voters to vote, 
Shelby County instead made it much easier for jurisdictions that 
have previously discriminated to discriminate once again-as 
demonstrated by the changes made by a number of the previously 
affected jurisdictions to re-impose discriminatory voting practices 
shortly after the decision was announced. 328 
The decisions of the Burger, Rehnquist, and Roberts 
Courts are placed in particularly harsh light when compared to 
those of the Warren Court half a century ago.329 The Warren 
325 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); see McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. 
Ct. 1434 (2014}. In these cases, the Court has favored the wealthy (who often have copious 
funds to invest) by conferring enhanced "personhood" status on corporations and other 
organizations, to which skeptics are said to wryly reply: "(A] corporation will never truly be 
a citizen until you can execute one in Texas." Timothy Egan, The Conscience of a 
Corporation, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2015}, http:l/www.nytimes.com/2015/04/03/opiriion/ 
timothy-egan-the-conscience-of-a-corporation.html?emc=edit_th_20150404&nl=todayshead 
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Court did in fact attempt to meet a standard of "taking whatever 
steps we can to ensure that everyone has a fair chance" to 
participate meaningfully in the political process.330 Dubbed the 
"fair politics" institution by some,331 the Warren Court played a 
vital role in guaranteeing the political liberty of all Americans 
with its landmark "one person, one vote" reapportionment cases. 
Indeed, "Chief Justice Warren claimed the reapportionment 
decisions as his Court's greatest accomplishment because more 
than any other decisions ... they attempted to create a fair society 
in which everyone has an equal chance . . . . [P]olitics should 
provide 'fair and effective representation for all citizens."'332 
Were they to adopt a Rawlsian-based justice-as-fairness 
approach to the campaign finance and voting rights cases, the 
Justices in the majority in Citizens United and Shelby County 
(Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Samuel Alito, Anthony 
Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, and Clarence Thomas) would imagine 
from behind the veil-of-ignorance that they might themselves be 
members of an at-risk minority or other group ~hose votes are in 
Fifty years of Supreme Court tinkering with our political system has resulted 
in a democracy so dysfunctional that no rational person would choose it. 
The people, through their elected representatives, gave us an effective Voting 
Rights Act to protect minority voters. The Supreme Court told us that we don't 
need it anymore. The people gave us a campaign finance law limiting the 
expansive political power of the rich. The Supreme Court told us that unlimited 
campaign spending by the.1 percent doesn't corrupt the democratic process. 
The people gave us a practical way to allow underfunded candidates to 
compete with rich ones. The Supreme Court told us that it was unfair to the 
rich. The people walled off the vast trove of corporate wealth from our 
elections. The Supreme Court told us that unlimited corporate electioneering 
was good for us. 
The people drew legislative lines to help racial minorities recover from 
centuries of political exclusion. The Supreme Court told us that it was a 
dangerous form of racism. 
But when today's politicians entrench themselves in power by putting 
hurdles in the way of poor people voting, gerrymandering district lines to 
assure the re-election of incumbents, and stacking the electoral deck in favor 
of the majority party, the Supreme Court just stands by . 
. . . Poor people have to jump through hoops to vote. The party in power 
controls the outcome in too many legislative elections. And the superrich 
have turned too many of our elected representatives into wholly owned 
subsidiaries, and most of our elections into auctions. Madison would weep. 
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danger of being compromised by questionable districting practices 
and overly onerous registration requirements. Or they might be 
part of the vast majority of Americans who do not have great 
wealth or power, but who nonetheless care deeply about the 
issues confronting the nation. When such persons see hurdles 
being erected that make it more difficult for the less advantaged 
to vote and the massively outsized influence that those with great 
wealth or power are able to exert (with no possibility that they 
will ever be able to come close to having that sort of voice), they 
justifiably believe that the system is rigged. Situated among the 
at-risk individuals, each Justice, acting in his own self-interest, 
presumably would opt for striking down impediments to voting 
and upholding more stringent limits on campaign finance. 
A justice-as-fairness approach would enable the judiciary 
(not least the U.S. Supreme Court) to impartially address the 
social and political realities of the twenty-first century-a 
substantial improvement in administering justice for an 
institution too-often tarnished by the taint of bias and privilege. 
By combining elements of both the Supreme Court's 
jurisprudence under Chief Justice Warren and the political 
theorist John Rawls's groundbreaking "justice as fairness" theory, 
it is possible to devise an improved approach to judicial 
decisionmaking that would better serve America's core principles 
of liberty and equal justice for all. 

